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Recent intelligence disclosures, as well as, the perceived increase in media leak 
prosecutions have brought the topic of intelligence oversight to the center of the debate 
on government spying. This thesis identifies the importance of oversight, but also 
illustrates the dilemma of congressional dysfunction.  The research presented provides a 
basis for future discussions of oversight and legislative action regarding intelligence laws 
and authorities.  
 Peter Gill’s theory which ties intelligence oversight to the inherent public distrust 
of governments of democratic nations forms the foundation of the first chapter.  The 
chapter expands upon Gill’s assertions and attempts to correlate historic public trust 
levels with the authorities of the intelligence oversight bodies of United States, Canada, 
Great Britain, and Australia.   
The second chapter provides an updated look at the research conducted by Dr. 
Amy Zegart on the effectiveness of congressional oversight of the IC.  Previously, Zegart 
graded the effectiveness of congressional oversight using public source data from 1985 – 
2005.  This chapter conducts an updated analysis using public source data from 99
th
 
Congress to present. 
 Prosecuting those accused of leaking classified information to the media has 
always caused a contentious debate.  From the government’s standpoint, the purpose of 
criminal prosecution is to punish the offender and deter would be criminals.  The third 
chapter tests classical deterrence theory by evaluating the deterrent effect of prosecuting 
leakers on would be whistleblowers.  The results of this chapter overwhelmingly 
iii 
 
illustrate the likelihood of prosecution is remote, and the characteristics of the cases do 
not meet the criteria for creating a deterrent effect.   
This lack of deterrent effect combined with the negative perceptions of 
prosecuting leakers should be the impetus for Congress to introduce legislation targeting 
those individuals with unlawfully disclosing classified information.  Based on the 
importance of intelligence oversight, the ineffectiveness of HPSCI and SSCI illustrated in 
the second chapter is particularly concerning.  Absent structural reforms, this portfolio 
demonstrates the effectiveness of USIC oversight can be improved by merely enhancing 
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The term Democratic Dilemma represents the constant balancing between actions 
taken to ensure nation’s security and the founding principles of liberty in democratic 
nations.  As history has shown, this balancing act is more aptly described as a pendulum 
that swings towards more government power in times of insecurity, and more towards 
liberty as citizens feel more secure.  The unauthorized disclosures of classified 
information by Edward Snowden appear to have fomented the swinging of the pendulum 
back towards liberty. In light of this potential shift, this essay examines the correlation of 
public trust and government oversight and the effectiveness of current USIC oversight. 
Each chapter in this portfolio explores a different facet of intelligence oversight.  
The first chapter uniquely expands on Peter Gill’s theory alleging intelligence oversight 
in democratic governments can be attributed to an inherent to public distrust of the 
government.  Chapter two provides a fresh and updated comparative analysis between the 
work of the intelligence oversight committees and the congressional oversight 
committees.  Chapter three explores the deterrent effect of prosecuting individuals 
accused of disclosing classified information to the media without authorization. 
Chapter One, “TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA,” 
explores the theory proposed by Peter Gill that oversight and accountability in 
democracies can be tied to public distrust of government associated with democracies.  
This chapter uniquely expands on Gill’s assertions by conducting a comparison of 
historic public trust levels with the powers of the intelligence oversight bodies of United 
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States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia.  The countries were chosen based on their 
status as four of the mature, economically advanced, and western democratic nations. 
Chapter Two, “INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: UP-GRADING 
EFFECTIVENESS,” provides an update to the work of Dr. Amy Zegart on the 
effectiveness of congressional oversight of the IC.  The foundation of this chapter is the 
perception of dysfunctional oversight of the IC has resulted in massive violations of our 
privacy, as well as the use of an outdated law to prosecute those that release classified 
information without authorization.  Although it is easy to label congressional oversight as 
dysfunctional with relation to these two instances, it is important to grade its overall 
effectiveness against the baseline of activity for a wide range of congressional oversight 
committees.  Previously, Zegart graded the effectiveness of congressional oversight using 
public source data from 1985 – 2005 (at five year intervals) whereas this chapter relied 
on data from the 99
th
 Congress to present. 
 Chapter Three, “THE NON-DETERRENT EFFECT OF PROSECUTING 
LEAKS,” presents issues related to the prosecution of individual(s) for the unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information to reporters based on interpretations of the Espionage 
Act of 1917.  This chapter focuses on deterrent effect of using this statute to prosecute 
seven individuals between 1983 and 2013.  This chapter focuses on the deterrent effect of 
using the statute to prosecute seven individuals between 1983 and 2015.  The lack of 
convictions during this time period clearly illustrates a lack of deterrent effect, which is 
often at odds with the public outcry that the use of this law produces a chilling effect on 
potential sources and journalists.  The results of this chapter illustrate the effects of a lack 
of reform by oversight authorities on one issue related to intelligence. 
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In order to understand intelligence oversight, it is important to define intelligence, 
as well as understand the importance of oversight in the associated form of government.   
Intelligence is most aptly described as “mainly secret activities- targeting, collection, 
analysis, dissemination and action – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power 
relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities.”
1
  As this definition 
suggests, intelligence has differing purposes depending on the actor and different 
structures based on the political system.   
Intelligence agencies serve under the executive branch and collect prioritized 
information, which supports the development and execution of US policy.  Intelligence is 
collected from varying types of sources and can simplistically be separated into 
intelligence collected through human sources (HUMINT) and intelligence collected 
through technical or signals intelligence (SIGINT).  If done legally, these types of 
collection platform can provide information that is vital to our national security.  If done 
through an abuse of government powers, intelligence collection can violate of our 
nation’s founding principles: civil liberties.  
The autonomy of security and intelligence services refers to their ability to 
operate in the absence of oversight of their actions by another agency, commission or 
political body.  Peter Gill argues the level of autonomy of these services directly 
correlates to the political system of the country.
2
   Thus, authoritarian regimes possess 
                                               
1
 Peter Gill, "Theories of intellligence: Where are we, where should we go and how might we proceed?" In 
Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates, by Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, 208-
223. (New York: Routledge , 2009): 214. 
2
Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence in the Liberal Democratic State.(New York: Frank Cass 
& Co. LTD, 1994):64-70. 
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security and intelligence agencies with little or no oversight, and democratic nations 
would have stringent oversight.   
Democratic governments include nation-states where the people are governed by 
a representative body that is freely elected by the eligible population.  Typically, mature 
democratic governments tend to be strong states.   The stability of democratic 
governments allows these nation-states to focus on the security of the governed and thus 
focus intelligence and security agencies on the external threats to the constituency.   
While there are varying degrees of vulnerability in democratic nations to foreign 
‘attacks,’ most democratic states focus their intelligence on protecting the nation’s 
security and promoting economic prosperity.
3
   
The inherent distrust of the government by the inhabitants of democracies results 
in oversight of the government’s bureaucracies.  Although secrecy is a necessary 
condition of the intelligence services’ work, intelligence in a liberal democratic state 
needs to work within the context of the rule of law, checks and balances, and clear lines 
of responsibility. Democratic accountability, therefore, identifies the propriety and 
determines the efficacy of the services under these parameters. With regard to 
intelligence where the nature of the system is “mainly secret” one might expect would 
expect extensive oversight of the organizations. 
Although Gill’s oversight assertion hold true when comparing differing forms of 
government, this portfolio attempted to prove his assertions based on national levels of 
public trust in government.  As previously stated, this portfolio reviewed national public 
                                               
3
 Generalization formed from mission of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany 
intelligence agencies identified on their official websites (http://www.asio.gov.au/, 
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/index_en.html, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/, http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/index-eng.asp, and https://www.mi5.gov.uk/ 
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trust polls and intelligence oversight authorities of United States, Canada, Great Britain, 
and Australia.  The countries were chosen based on their status as four of the mature, 
economically advanced, and western democratic nations.  My research concluded the 
United States possesses the most stringent intelligence oversight apparatus of the 
countries reviewed.  As a result of the research, I unable to verify Gill’s assertions held 
true for similar countries.  This conclusion could have been limited by the lack of 
historical and consistently collected international public trust polling. 
From the creation of the United States intelligence system by the National 
Security Act of 1947, oversight responsibilities were relegated to the congressional sub-
committees first 30 years of its existence.
4
  The first reforms of the intelligence apparatus 
took 30 years to implement and were in response to the investigation by the United States 
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, commonly referred to as the Church Committee, which revealed egregious 
civil and human rights violations where the FBI and CIA investigated individuals or 
groups based on their speech.
5
  The Church Committee identified the FBI’s program, 
referred to as the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), aimed at 
infiltrating and investigating categories of groups and individuals believed to threaten 
domestic peace including the Communist Party of the USA; Socialist Workers Party; the 
White Hate Group; the Black Nationalist-Hate Group and the New Left.  In addition, the 
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Church Committee noted the FBI’s use of intrusive and warrantless wire surveillance and 
the unlawful opening of the mail of U.S. persons.
6
   
The findings of the Church Committee resulted in the establishment of two 
Congressional intelligence oversight committees, the United States Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (HPSCI), in 1976 and 1977, respectively.  In addition to the creation of 
legislative oversight bodies (HPSCI and SSCI), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to provide judicial 
oversight over the use of covert techniques to support national security investigations.  
Although judicial oversight provides an important piece of intelligence oversight, this 
portfolio focuses on the performance of the legislative oversight bodies. 
HPSCI and SSCI hold public hearings on intelligence issues to advocate for the 
public debate, as well as hold closed-door sessions for classified portions of the same 
debate or other topics.   The committees also have authority to investigate intelligence 
matters, which includes the power to compel witness testimony or document production 
through congressional subpoena. In addition, the committees have authority to legislate, 
which means they have the authority to confer with constituents, special interest groups, 
and the USIC to craft legislation that constrains, empowers, or reforms the bodies the 
committees oversee. 
                                               
6
 Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. "Intelligence 
Activities and the Rights of Americans." April 23, 1976. 
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIb.htm (accessed August 1, 2012).  
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Although considered to be the most effective tool in oversight, neither HPSCI nor 
SSCI, possess budgetary (or appropriations) authority over the intelligence community 
which they oversee.  Members of each chamber’s Appropriations Committee sit on each 
intelligence committee; however, budgetary authority over the USIC is delegated to the 
Appropriations Committee itself.   The Appropriation’s budget authority is limited to 
passage of an overall budget as opposed to allotting specific amounts for targeted 
programs which would defund untenable programs and force the intelligence agencies to 
focus resources on activities deemed important to Congress.  HPSCI and SSCI may lack 
appropriation’s authority; however, the committees have the authority to hold public and 
closed hearings, request briefings and conduct interviews, introduce and consider 
legislation; issue subpoenas for testimony, and authorize the use of funds appropriated to 
the USIC.  
The inability to pass Intelligence Authorization legislation between FY 2006-
2009, DOJ’s use of the Espionage Act of 1917 to investigate and prosecute leakers, and 
the inability to pass intelligence reforms that could have potentially prevented the 9/11 
attacks have all been cited as evidence of oversight failures.  Rather than judging HPSCI 
and SSCI’s oversight on one or two failures, this portfolio follows Zegart’s method of 
comparing legislative activity levels (hearings held, legislation considered/passed, and 
legislative success rates) of HPSCI and SSCI to other House and Senate committees.  
Overwhelmingly, the comparison reveals that HPSCI and SSCI’s level of legislative 
activity was less than the average of other committee activity levels.
7
  Impartial 
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Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner, “Policy Agendas Project:  Datasets & Codebooks,” Policy Agendas 
Project Web site, accessed May 1, 2015, http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks. 
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evaluation of the numbers suggests that Congress has not spent enough time overseeing 
the USIC.   
The common misperception of intelligence oversight is that it is solely meant to 
prevent intelligence failures and government abuses.  However, oversight includes the 
drafting and consideration of laws under which the USIC operates.  The unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information by Edward Snowden ignited a heated debate about 
government spying, oversight failures, and the prosecution of leakers.  Oversight failure 
and the prosecution of leakers seem unrelated; however they are in fact intertwined.   
Once such statute, 18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, transmitting or losing defense 
information, stands at the center of the debate about prosecuting leakers.   The statute 
indicates the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to an unauthorized 
recipient is a crime punishable by up to ten years imprisonment, forfeiture of property 
and funds, and fines for each count.
8
  Although this statute provides the justification for 
investigation media leaks, the identified leakers have sometimes been charged with or 
pled guilty to lesser charges. 
 Critics argue the use of statutes born out of the Espionage Act of 1917 is a 
draconian attempt to stifle first amendment rights and deter future whistleblowers.  
Moreover, critics argue the act was passed in response to foreign spy networks during 
World War I and should not be applied individuals releasing information to the media.
9
  
Supporters of media leak prosecutions point to the damage done to national security. In a 
speech delivered to the Heritage Foundation, Chairman of the House Select Committee 
                                               
8
Cornell Law School, “18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information,” 
Cornell Law School Web site, accessed May 1, 2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/793. 
9
Charlie Savage, “For U.S. Inquiries on Leaks, a Difficult Road to Prosecution,” New York Times, June 9, 




on Intelligence, Representative Pete Hoekstra, clearly stated that “some of the worst 
damage done to our intelligence community has come not from penetration by spies, but 
from unauthorized leaks by those with access to classified information.”
10
   
Journalists may not be liked, but no one is calling them spies regardless of the 
media spin.  The unauthorized publication of classified information is received by a 
plethora of foreign intelligence agencies whereas spies typically provide information to a 
limited number of agencies.  The damage caused by the compromise of either SIGINT or 
HUMINT is worth noting.  A media report quoting or referring to HUMINT can result in 
the loss of access to the reporting channel either because of an overabundance of caution 
(often referred to as operational security) or in a worst case scenario the intelligence 
contained in the article is singular in nature and results in the imprisonment or execution 
of the source.  
SIGINT compromises result in the loss of significant resources expended in the 
research, development and installation of the technology responsible for the collection 
platform.  SIGINT collection is often facilitated by human sources; therefore, any 
compromise of a SIGINT platform could possible result in the imprisonment or death of a 
human source as described above. Some SIGINT platforms are designed for a particular 
target, but many SIGINT techniques are used for multiple targets.  Thus, the compromise 
of either HUMINT or SIGINT to the media can have far reaching consequences.   
                                               
10
Pete Hoekstra, Secrets and Leaks: The Costs and Consequences for National Security, July 29, 2005, 




As previously stated, critics of media leak prosecutions claim the draconian use of 
this outdated law deters potential whistleblowers.  The purpose of criminal prosecution is 
two-fold: punish the offender and deter would-be criminals.  Based on this perceived 
agreement on this point (albeit for different reasons), this portfolio reviewed the case 
particulars for historical prosecutions of media leaks to determine if they serve as a 
deterrent.  The results overwhelmingly suggest that prosecuting media leaks do not serve 
as a deterrent to would be criminals.  Critics of media leak prosecutions have claimed 
potential leakers would be deterred long before the disclosures of Bradley Manning and 
Snowden.  Their disclosures, which are considered the most massive in history, along 
with the data presented in this chapter confirm the lack of deterrent effect.  The lack of a 
deterrent effect combined with the negative perception of using 18 U.S. Code § 793 to 
prosecute media leaks should serve as an impetus for congressional consideration and 













CHAPTER ONE:  TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA  
INTRODUCTION 
Almost all nations, regardless of size and economic condition, have found it 
necessary to develop a clandestine system for the purpose of gathering and analyzing 
information involving threats to the nation’s security.
11
  According to Mark Lowenthal, 
“each nation practices intelligence in ways that are specific-if not peculiar- to that nation 
alone.”
12
  Lowenthal’s observation of the distinctive nature of intelligence provides an 
opportunity for research into national intelligence organizations and their associated 
structures.   Disclosures of intelligence activities and failures often result in enormous 
scrutiny of any nation’s intelligence services.  However, little public attention is ever paid 
to the oversight apparatus responsible for overseeing these agencies.  
          Out of the 194 countries currently recognized by the U.S. State Department, 
approximately 116 countries have some sort of intelligence and/or security agency.
13
  
However, only about 19 of the 116, or 11%, of these countries possess an external 
oversight apparatus responsible for some form of supervision of the agencies.
 
  The 19 
countries include the following countries that possess some form of democratic or 
parliamentary government:  Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Germany, 
                                               
11
Arthur S. Hulnick and Joe Wippl,  "FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SYSTEMS." Boston 
University. 2009. http://www.bu.edu/ir/files/2010/06/Syllabi_IR_578_Hulnick.pdf (accessed April 10, 
2013).1 
12
 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 11. 
13
 U.S. State Department. A-Z List of Country and Other Area Pages. 2013. 
http://www.state.gov/misc/list/index.htm (accessed April 10, 2013). 
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Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South 
Africa, South Korea, the U.S. and Great Britain.
14
 
 With respect to security and intelligence services, autonomy can be associated 
with a lack of oversight of the services by another agency, commission or political body.  
According to Peter Gill, the level of autonomy of these services directly correlates to the 
political system of the country.   In particular, Gill alleges that the protection of human 
rights associated with democracies results in higher levels of oversight, where as in 
totalitarian regimes the survival of the state trumps the concerns of tactics used by the 
intelligence and security services.
15
  Scholarship on the collective authorities, resources, 
oversight, and the duties of intelligence agencies of particular nations have been lacking 
thus far and efforts to incorporate accountability and oversight into the theory intelligence 
have been non-existent to date.
16
   
 Thus, Gill’s assertion that the public distrust in government inherent in 
democracies presents a unique opportunity for transnational comparison of the oversight 
apparatus of democratic nations.  Based on Gill’s assessment of levels of oversight, there 
should be a correlation between public trust figures and the level of oversight amongst 
nations.  For example, higher levels of public distrust for the national government should 
be correlated with more extensive oversight of the intelligence apparatus and vice versa.    
                                               
14
Anthony Glees, Philip H.J. Davies, and John N.L. Morrison, The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain's 
Intelligence and Security Committee (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2006), 15. 
15
Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence in the Liberal Democratic State.(New York: Frank 
Cass & Co. LTD, 1994),  
16
 Peter Gill, "Theories of intellligence: Where are we, where should we go and how might we proceed?" In 
Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates, by Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, 208-
223. (New York: Routledge , 2009): 222. 
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This chapter uniquely expands on Gill’s oversight theory through comparison of 
historic public trust levels with the powers of the intelligence oversight bodies of the 
United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia to determine if there is a correlation.  
Comparative analysis of intra-national intelligence oversight mechanisms is limited by 
the pool of countries that employ these bodies.  For this essay, the countries were chosen 
based on their status as four of the mature and economically advanced, western 
democratic nations as well as their involvement in United Kingdom – United States of 
America Agreement (UKUSA). 
DEFINING GOOD OVERSIGHT 
 As previously stated, the purpose of this chapter is to determine if there is any 
discernible link between historical median public trust levels and the level of intelligence 
oversight in democratic nations.  Based on assumptions made from Gill’s research and 
literature, I hypothesize that the nations whose populations generally possess a greater 
distrust in government will be associated with governments that have implemented 
stringent oversight of their intelligence organizations.  Testing of this hypothesis requires 
a brief introduction to intelligence followed by an in depth analysis of public trust polling 
and oversight.  The knowledge gained from this review will provide the basis for the 
analysis of the public trust numbers and oversight authorities associated with the United 
States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.  
The foundation of any scholarship regarding the study of intelligence systems 
requires the term to be clearly defined.  A generally accepted definition of intelligence 
has not been developed to date.  Some scholars limit the definition of intelligence to 
include only secret information, while others believe it is a combination of open source 
14 
 
and secret information. Others include any and all actions taken to obtain and process the 
information in the definition of intelligence.  For the purposes of this essay, Peter Gill’s 
definition of intelligence seems the most appropriate.  According to Gill, intelligence can 
be defined as “mainly secret activities- targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and 
action – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by 
forewarning of threats and opportunities.”
17
   
An actor’s intelligence system is comprised of intelligence agencies focused on 
their piece of the country’s intelligence process.  Intelligence services are usually 
classified as foreign, domestic or unitary.  Foreign intelligence services, such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the U.S. or the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in 
the U.K., typically focus on threats from outside a nation’s borders whereas domestic 
intelligence services, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the U.S. and 
the Secret Service (MI5) in the U.K., focus on threats from within borders.  The Canadian 
Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) is an example of a unitary service where the 
foreign and domestic efforts are combined in one agency. 
 As Gill’s definition suggests, intelligence has differing purposes depending on the 
actor and different structures based on the political system.  Democratic governments 
include nation-states where the people are governed by a representative body that is 
freely elected by the eligible population.  Typically, mature democratic governments tend 
to be associated with strong states.   The stability of democratic governments allows these 
nation-states to focus on the security of the governed and thus focus intelligence and 
                                               
17
 Peter Gill, "Theories of intellligence: Where are we, where should we go and how might we proceed?" In 
Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates, by Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, 208-
223. (New York: Routledge , 2009): 214. 
15 
 
security agencies on the external threats to the constituency.   While there are varying 
degrees of vulnerability in democratic nations to foreign ‘attacks’, most democratic states 




 With respect to security and intelligence services, autonomy can be associated 
with a lack of oversight of the services by another agency, commission or political body.  
Gill argues the level of autonomy of these services directly correlates to the political 
system of the country.
19
   The inherent distrust of the government by the inhabitants of 
democracies results in oversight of the government’s bureaucracies.  With regard to 
intelligence where the nature of the system is “mainly secret” one would expect extensive 
oversight of the organizations. 
As indicated above, Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. are amongst the 19 
countries that employ some level of oversight including political commission, legislative 
body and or judicial process
20
 over their respective intelligence communities.  Although 
there is an abundance of literature detailing how to improve oversight or reasons why the 
U.S. have not reformed its oversight, I have been unable to identify any credible 
scholarly work indicating that any level of oversight  can possibly prevent all intelligence 
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 Generalization formed from mission of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany 
intelligence agencies identified on their official websites (http://www.asio.gov.au/, 
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/index_en.html, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/, http://www.csis-
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19
Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence in the Liberal Democratic State.(New York: Frank 
Cass & Co. LTD, 1994), 66-72. 
20
 Generalization formed from information identified on Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, France, 
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http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/index_en.html, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/, http://www.csis-
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on eight years experience. 
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failures or abuses nor ensure that the agency(ies) it oversees will function 100% 
effectively or efficiently.  However, the appropriate level of oversight can mitigate the 
potential for abuse and failure, vigorously investigate allegations of either and promote 
systematic changes based on lessons learned to minimize the chance of recurrence.   
The majority of literature on the subject of intelligence oversight is American 
centric.    In fact, research of the topic of intelligence oversight identified The Open Side 
of Secrecy, which details the first ten years of the United Kingdom’s Intelligence and 
Security Committee, as one of the only scholarly works analyzing the effectiveness of 
oversight bodies or other issues related to oversight in countries other than the U.S.  The 
absence of literature outside of the American-centric works could be problematic for this 
essay depending on the applicability of this research to foreign oversight apparatus.  The 
lack of research regarding the topic could possibly be associated with a lack of scholarly 
interest, a lack of notable oversight or a lack of oversight records in other countries.  
According to Amy Zegart, effective oversight is difficult to define.  She attributes 
this difficulty to three things: 1) differing opinions of good oversight 2) conflicting 
mandates within agencies and 3) invisible and/or unaccountable oversight activities.
21
  
Zegart’s analysis of the difficulties in analyzing oversight is spot-on.   Government 
oversight could mean entirely different things to civil rights groups or supporters of open-
government than it does intelligence officers or even judges.  In addition, it is impossible 
to know or even estimate the number of or effect of every ad hoc briefing or 
communication with the oversight apparatus that occurs outside the normal course of 
                                               
21
Amy B. Zegart, Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 2011), 17-19. 
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business.  Thus, evaluation of oversight is limited to the publically available information.  
As our analysis is limited by the publically available information, we must evaluate the 
founding authorities of the oversight mechanisms and the effectiveness.    
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz aptly compare the available means 
of conducting oversight to that of “police-patrol” or “fire alarm.”  In the “police-patrol” 
method, the oversight apparatus constantly reviews the body it oversees, much like a 
police-man patrolling the streets, whereas with the “fire-alarm” method is can be 
associated with intense oversight in response to a crisis or failure much like a firemen 
responding to a fire-alarm.
22
  The framework and models used by McCubbins and 
Schwartz has become the foundation of significant research in the topic of intelligence 
oversight by researchers such as Loch K. Johnson and Zegart.   
Johnson and Zegart have used the “police-patrol” and “fire-alarm” metaphors in 
their scholarly worked aimed at identifying the shortcomings of congressional oversight, 
reasons for congress’ resistance to change and to support their recommendations for 
congressional oversight reform.  Although both forms of oversight have their benefits, 
“police-patrol” is the most effective means of oversight when combined with budgetary 
and authoritative powers over the agencies.  “Fire-alarm” is considered the most time 
efficient for congress where a considerable amount of their time must be dedicated the 
other issues (domestic and constituent) that aid in their re-election to office.
23
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Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and 
Fire Alarms," American Journal of Political Science (1984): 165-168. 
23
David Mayhew, The Electoral Connection, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 5-7. 
18 
 
In her book, Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence 
Community, Zegart provides comparative analysis of various Congressional oversight 
committees using data regarding committee meetings, legislation considered and 
legislation passed and committee experience.  The evidence overwhelmingly suggests 
that Congressional intelligence oversight can be described as sporadic and inconsistent 
“patrolling” that reverts to the “fire-alarm” model after failures.
24
  
In “Secret Spy Agencies and a Shock Theory of Accountability,” Johnson 
describes what he terms as the “Shock Theory of Accountability.”  Johnson continues to 
use the metaphors coined by McCubbins and Schwartz, but differs slightly from Zegart’s 
previous work on Congressional oversight.  Johnson’s analysis of intelligence 
accountability illustrates how recent intelligence failure or scandals have resulted in 
intense periods of oversight “patrolling” and remedial legislation aimed at preventing 
future lapses.  Johnson coins the term, “Shock Theory of Accountability,” to describe the 




As clearly indicated above, good oversight is difficult to identify and is subjective 
to the person describing it.  The mere existence of oversight is a positive sign, especially 
when it comes to “mainly secret” activities in democratic states.   Robust oversight is 
necessary to mitigate the chances of intelligence failures or scandals, but it also threatens 
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the “secrecy” in which intelligence is based.  Research into the appropriate level of 
oversight is not the focus of this essay.  As previously indicated, this essay will attempt to 
correlate public trust levels to the levels of intelligence oversight in democratic nations. 
 With the issues of intelligence and oversight presented, it is important to discuss 
the role of public trust in government.  Research by Todd Donovan, David Denemark and 
Shaun Bowler attempted to reconcile dissimilar levels of public trust with 29 
economically advanced democracies based on data from the 2004 ISSP module.  The 
scholars noted a disparity in public trust amongst the democratic governments ranging 
from 9% in Japan to 55% in Denmark.  In particular, they noted that only 31% of 
American’s trust that people in the government will do what is right most of the time.  
This level of trust may seem low; however, the US ranks higher than 18 of the countries 
surveyed.  Great Britain was close behind the U.S. with 29%, while Australians and 
Canadians indicated a higher level of trust in their governments with 40% and 37%, 
respectively.
26
   
Donovan, et al set out to investigate the role of history and culture in public 
trust.
27
  The group found that the economic conditions, anxieties about security and/or 
terrorism, and polarizing views of the contemporary views of the current political party 
all affect the levels of trust in government across nations differently and thus make 
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predictions difficult.  The findings clearly show that irregular public trust numbers 
without data regarding the current state of national affairs prevents proper analysis.  In 
addition, the group does not address the mitigating or aggravating effects of the evolution 
in news media over the last forty years.  Undoubtedly, the advent of the 24-hour news 
cycle has had some effect on public trust levels.  Although it is important to acknowledge 
the potential impact of the media on public trust, this issue is one for future study. 
The work by Donovan, et.al aids in the investigation of oversight in democratic 
nations by identifying the pitfalls of trying to tie public trust to similar governments.
28
  In 
some case, the sporadic collection of data circa events observed by the public to be 
successes or failures tends to skew the data to one extreme or the other.   For example, 
Gallup.com polling data from 2002 indicated an 18% jump in favorable rating from 2000 
polling.  More than likely, the higher level of trust can be associated with the U.S. 
government action to bring those seen as responsible for the 9/11 attacks to justice.  
Polling data from 2005 indicates a 23% decline in the government’s favorable rating 
from 2002 levels.
29
   Most likely, this decline can be associated with the well-publicized 
reports indicating that intelligence failures that led the U.S. to war in Iraq in 2003.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS  
 Although a wealth of information can be found regarding comparisons national 
intelligence systems and their effectiveness, little comparative attention has been paid to 
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oversight studies.  In particular, scholars of oversight have focused on the American 
system and have limited these studies to the bureaucratic structure, effectiveness of the 
system and Congress’s resistance to reform.  Comparative analysis of intelligence 
oversight bodies can be just as useful for the policymakers as comparative analysis of the 
intelligence systems.  This chapter attempts to determine what, if any, correlation can be 
made between public trust levels and the level of intelligence oversight in democratic 
governments.  Inferences from Gill’s assertions regarding oversight lead me to believe 
that the nation(s) that trust its government the least possesses the greatest level of 
oversight. 
METHODOLOGY 
 The case studies for this chapter test the proposition that levels of 
intelligence oversight in democratic nations can be tied to the level of public trust.   As 
previously stated, higher levels of public trust in government should be associated with a 
lesser degree of oversight of a nation’s intelligence apparatus.  The case studies will 
specifically look at the intelligence and oversight mechanisms of four of the five 
countries involved in the UKUSA agreement: United States, Australia, Canada and Great 
Britain.  Historical public trust polling will be compared to the oversight mechanism for 
each nation to determine whether the level of public trust can be correlated to the level of 
oversight.  For the purposes of this essay, the median level available public trust numbers 
are useful and sufficient for identifying a potentially cultural trust in the government by 
Australians, Canadians, Americans and Britons.    
22 
 
Glees, et al described intelligence oversight bodies in democracies as the external 
accountability mechanisms whose mission is two-fold: 1) to ensure efficient and effective 
operation of the agencies it oversees 2) to prevent abuses and violations of law.
30
   Based 
on Gill’s assertions one can expect some level of intelligence oversight in democratic 
governments.  Even the slightest form of oversight can have some effect in 
accomplishing the mission.  However, the most extensive oversight includes bodies that 
have some level of budgetary and/or administration authority over the agencies they 
oversee combined with intelligence experience of the oversight members. 
 The “police-patrol” and “fire alarm” oversight methods each offer positive 
accountability of intelligence agency activities.  However, “police-patrol” provides a 
much more effective means based on the ability to prevent failures or crisis before they 
occur.  As this means is more effective, this essay will assign a score of “1” for countries 
that employ “police-patrol” methods, a score of “0.5” for countries using the “fire alarm” 
method and a score of “0.75” for any country employing sporadic patrol.  In addition, 
each nation will be assigned a score of “1” for the oversight organisms that possess either 
budgetary or other authority over the intelligence community of each nation.  Countries 
with external oversight bodies that possess no authority over their intelligence structure 
will be assigned a score of “0.0” and countries with limited authority will be assigned a 
score of “0.5.” Finally, a score of “1.0” will be assigned for countries that possess 
significant intelligence experience amongst personnel assigned to the particular nation’s 
oversight bodies and a score of “0.5” for countries with little experience or regular 
turnover. 
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The overall oversight score, which combines a weighted score for both 
effectiveness and authority, will be assigned by the sum of the two scores for each 
country.  If the hypothesis for this essay is correct, the countries associated with the lower 
public trust levels should be associated with the higher oversight scores.  If the lower 
public trust numbers cannot be associated with the countries with higher levels of 
oversight, then the hypothesis is incorrect.  Regardless of the outcome, the findings 
should produce a basis for future research. 
MAIN DISCUSSION 
 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or the United 
Kingdom as it is often referred as, is notionally a Constitutional monarchy.  In reality, the 
government is divided into an executive branch led by the Prime Minister and a 
bicameral legislative branch consisting of the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons.  Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom does not have a constitution 
that clearly defines the rights of its citizens or other governing principals.  The United 
Kingdom is governed through statutes and partly common law and practice.  The country 
is broken down into 27 counties, 32 London boroughs and 1 City of London or 
Greater London, 36 metropolitan districts, and 56 unitary authorities.
31
 
Britain’s executive branch, the Cabinet, is not bridled by the checks and balances 
inherent in the U.S. system and thus enjoys supremacy beyond the U.S. President.  The 
Cabinet may make appointments and declarations without conferring with the Parliament, 
where it enjoys the majority within the House of Commons.   In addition, Great Britain 
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does not possess a written Bill of Rights that protects specific civil rights.  Only recently 




 The United Kingdom intelligence collection efforts are split amongst three 
national intelligence agencies.  The Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6, is responsible for 
the Nation’s collection of intelligence against foreign security threats.  The General 
Communications Headquarters, or GHGQ, is responsible for the nations Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) and information security for the government and armed forces.  
The Secret Service, or MI5 as the agency is also known, is tasked with domestic 
counterintelligence and security responsibilities.  Although fundamental differences 
between the British and American intelligence communities exist, MI6 is comparable to 
the CIA, GCHQ is similar to the National Security Agency, and MI5 is most like the 
FBI.
33
   
 The Intelligence Services Act of 1994 (ISA) established the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC), which consists of representatives from the House of Lords 
and House of Commons.  The Prime Minister appoints members to the ISC in 
coordination and with the concurrence of the opposition party.  The members of the 
committee often change upon the election of a new majority party.  The committee is 
tasked with financial, administration and policy oversight of the United Kingdom’s three 
intelligence agencies and its powers are is limited to the supervision and evaluation of the 
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agencies’ performance in regards to these matters.
34
  The ISC reports its findings and 
recommendations to the Prime Minister before they are presented to Parliament.  
 Between 2007 and 2012, the ISC held approximately 23 formal meetings and 12 
informal meetings a year in furtherance of its oversight duties and responsibilities.
35
 As 
required in its founding legislation, the ISC produces an annual report regarding its yearly 
work, as well as special ‘ad hoc’ reports on issues deemed appropriate.  Since its 
establishment in 1994 the ISC has complied with this requirement and produced 17 
annual reports, as well as 10 special reports detailing the findings of the ISC’s 
investigation into such events as 2002 terror attack in Bali, the 2005 terror attacks in 
London and the issue of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program to name a few.  
36
  
 Based on the publically available information, the work of the ISC can be 
described as both “police-patrol” and “fire-alarm.”  By holding 35 formal and informal 
meetings annually, the ISC has clearly demonstrated that the committee is fully engaged 
in its founding directive and is thus “patrolling” the bodies it oversees.  The 10 ‘ad hoc’ 
reports published since its founding suggests that the committee increases oversight in 
response to perceived intelligence failures and abuses by the United Kingdom’s 
intelligence service.  Unfortunately, by limiting the ISC’s authority to supervision and 
evaluation of the intelligence services, the United Kingdom has limited the committee’s 
ability to force change amongst the services or direct the services to allocate resources to 
                                               
34
Anthony Glees, Philip H.J. Davies, and John N.L. Morrison, The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain's 
Intelligence and Security Committee (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2006), 173. 
35
The Intelligence and Security Committee. Annual Reports. http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-
reports/annual-reports (accessed May 1, 2013). 
36
 The Intelligence and Security Committee. Annual Reports. http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-
reports/annual-reports (accessed May 1, 2013).  
26 
 
issues deemed important to Parliament.  Based on the information provided, the United 
Kingdom’s Total Oversight Score is as follows: 
1.0 (police-patrol) + 0.0 (oversight with no authority) + 0.25 (limited experience) = 1.25  
 Australia’s intelligence collection efforts are split between two national 
intelligence agencies and several agencies within the Australian Department of Defence.  
Australia’s national intelligence services include the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Service (ASIS) and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).   ASIS is 
responsible for the collection of overseas foreign intelligence and is similar to the CIA, 
whereas ASIO is Australia’s national security service and maintains a role similar to that 
of the FBI’s counterintelligence mission.  Similar to the FBI, the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) serves as Australia’s police force and is responsible for enforcement of 
federal laws.  The AFP has grown its intelligence capabilities to meet ongoing security 
challenges; however, law enforcement remains its primary responsibility.
37
 
 The origins of Australia’s intelligence oversight can be found in the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, which created the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee (PJC) to oversee ASIO.   This committee was replaced in March 2002 by the 
Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (PJCAAD).  The PJC was replaced 
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) based on the 
recommendations of the “Flood Report” in 2005.
38
   The tension within Australia’s 
parliamentary government resides between the political parties rather than between the 
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branches of government as is the case with the United States.  To alleviate the inherent 
distrust between political parties, PJCIS consists of members appointed by the prime 
minister in consultation with the opposition party.  Thus, the make-up of the committee 
often changes with the election of a new majority political party. 
Although the committee was renamed in 2005, its oversight authorities are based 
on the Intelligence Services Act of 2001 (ISA).  The act requires the PJCIS to review the 
administration and expenditures associated with Australia’s intelligence community 
annually, investigate any matter referred to the committee by one of the Ministers and 
provide Parliament with an annual report of the committee’s activities.  Language 
contained in the ISA prevents the committee from unilaterally initiating investigations 
into intelligence matters and limits the information the committee can request and/or 
receive in furtherance of its oversight activities.
39
 On its website, the PJCIS 
acknowledges its oversight abilities by stating that the language contained within the ISA 
limits the committee’s “capacity to inquire into operational matters and the intelligence 
gathering and assessment priorities of the relevant intelligence agencies.”
40
  
Between 2007 and 2012, the PJCIS issued annual reports of its findings to the 
Prime Minister, as required by ISA.  During this time period, the committee has also 
published approximately four reports a year based on reviews requested by Ministers (as 
required by law).  In addition to the research and inspections necessary to conduct its 
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mandated oversight, the committee also received approximately six private briefings 
annually to aid in their efforts.
41
  The information available does not the specific 
information discussed in the briefings or the committee attendance rate at these briefings.  
Thus, it is difficult to gauge their value towards the committees overall oversight.   
As previously described, the PJCIS must conduct regular reviews of the 
administration and expenditures of the Australian intelligence community.  The lack of 
budgetary authority, as well as the statutory limits placed on the committee’s 
investigative efforts, prevents the committee from effectively overseeing the governed.  
Thus, Australia’s Total Oversight Score is as follows: 
 0.75 (sporadic patrol) + 0.0 (oversight with no authority) + 0.25 (limited experience) = 1.0 
 Like the United Kingdom and Australia, Canada has a constitutional monarchy 
but is governed by a parliamentary democracy.  The executive branch is headed by the 
Prime Minister and the Federal Ministry, which typically consists of officials from 
Parliament who are appointed by the Prime Minister.  The legislative branch of the 
Canadian government consists of a bicameral Parliament including the Senate and House 
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 Unlike other democratic nations described in this essay, the Canadian approach to 
national security is issue based rather than based on the geographic location of the threat.  
As such, Canada’s intelligence community includes agencies that other countries might 
not consider intelligence related.  Canada’s intelligence community includes the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communication Security 
Establishment Canada (CSEC),   Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA), Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Canadian Air 
Transport Security Authority (CATSA), and the Privy Council Office (PVO).
43
   CSEC is 
responsible for Canada’s SIGINT, as well as information assurance missions and is 
similar to the NSA.  CSIS represents Canada’s intelligence collection agency and 
includes both foreign and domestic intelligence missions. 
 Prior to 1984, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was responsible for 
both Canada’s intelligence collection and national law enforcement efforts.  In response 
to terrorist and espionage threats of the 1960s and 1970s, the RCMP was designated as 
the national police force and CSIS was created as the nation’s national security agency.  
As the nation’s security agency, CSIS is tasked with pro-actively identifying threats, 
analyzing information and producing intelligence products to inform and protect the 
government and its citizens from nation’s threats which are currently prioritized as 
“terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage, foreign 
interference and cyber-tampering affecting critical infrastructure.”
44
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The CSIS Act not only created the agency itself, but also the oversight body for 
CSIS activities:  the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).  The Prime 
Minister appoints members to the SIRC in coordination and with the concurrence of the 
opposition party.  The members of the committee often can change upon the election of a 
new majority party.  The SIRC regularly reviews CSIS activities on behalf of Parliament 
and report their findings accordingly.   The review of CSIS activities includes regular 
meetings with CSIS executives, visiting regional offices to understand daily operations, 
discussions with other security and intelligence personnel, as well as attendance at 
international intelligence forums,
45




 The oversight powers of the SIRC are so expansive that the bodies can review all 
of CSIS’s holdings upon request and without the need for judicial or legislative warrant.  
However, the committee does not possess any legislative or budgetary authority over 
CSIS.    As previously stated, the SIRC identifies potential flaws in CSIS practices and 
provides recommendations that address the issues.  Since its founding in 1984, the SIRC 
has produce 28 annual reports
47
 approximately 100 other special reports
48
 detailing the 
committee’s findings and recommendations on a variety of other issues. 
 The oversight mechanism in Canada is reflective of the parliamentary system.  Oversight 
in Canada is founded in the distrust between the major parties, whereas U.S. oversight is founded 
in the inherent distrust between the executive and legislative branches of government.   Although 
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the committee has extensive powers to review CSIS activities and records, it does not 
have any powers to curtail CSIS actions.  Based on the provided description, intelligence 
oversight in Canada can be described as “police-patrol.”  However, this patrolling is 
limited by the committee’s lack of legislative or budgetary authority over CSIS.  Thus, 
Canada’s Total Oversight Score is as follows: 
.75 (sporadic patrol) + 0.0 (oversight with no authority) + 0.25 (limited experience) = 1.0 
 Unlike the previously reviewed countries, the United States is a constitution-
based federal republic consisting of 50 states and one district.  The federal government is 
divided into three branches: executive, judicial and legislative.  The executive branch is 
headed by the President of the United States and his cabinet of appointed officials.  The 
judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court and a lower system of federal courts.  The 
legislative branch consists of a bicameral Congress including the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.
49
  The United States government provides a unique 
system of checks and balances that ensures no branch of the government becomes too 
strong and ensures the nation’s laws do not infringe on the rights of its citizens. 
 The United States Intelligence Community (USIC) consists of 16 federal agencies 
of federal government responsible for the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence 
in support of the national security and foreign policy strategies.  The significant number 
of agencies within the USIC makes comparison with lesser resourced nations difficult 
and somewhat outside the purview of this essay.  However, as previously discussed the 
CIA is responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence, the NSA is responsible for 
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the collection of SIGINT, and the FBI is responsible for domestic intelligence and 
counterintelligence.  
 The findings of the United States Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly referred to 
as the Church Committee, revealed some of the most egregious violations of civil and 
human rights where the FBI and CIA investigated individuals or groups based on their 
speech and/or expressions.
50
  Specifically, the Church Committee identified abuses by an 
FBI program, referred to as the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), 
aimed at illegally infiltrating and investigating groups believed to threaten domestic 
peace. In addition, the Church Committee noted the FBI’s use of intrusive and 
warrantless wire surveillance and the unlawful opening of mail of U.S. persons.
51
  The 
findings of the Church Committee resulted in the establishment of two Congressional 
intelligence oversight committees, the United States Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), in 
1976 and 1977, respectively.   
Zegart dedicates a chapter of her book, Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United 
States Intelligence Community, on a comparative analysis between the activity of these 
oversight committees and the activity of other congressional committees between 1985 
and 2005.  The data presented clearly indicates a lack of activity by the committees, 
                                               
50
 Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 
"Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans." April 23, 1976, accessed August 1, 2012, 
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIb.htm.  
51
 Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 




especially when compared to committees associated with domestic responsibilities that 
can be associated with sporadic “patrolling” with occasional “fire-alarm” oversight.  In 
addition, Zegart analyzes committee assignments over the identified years and identifies a 




Currently, neither committee, HPSCI nor SSCI, possess budgetary authority over 
the intelligence community.  Members of each chamber’s Appropriations Committee sit 
on each intelligence committee; however, budgetary authority over the committee is 
delegated to the Appropriations Committee itself.   The Appropriation’s budget authority 
is limited to passage of an overall budget as opposed to allotting specific amounts for 
targeted programs which would force the intelligence agencies to focus resources on 
activities deemed important to Congress. 
 Based on the information provided, the Total Oversight Score for the United 
States is as follows: 
0.75 (sporadic patrol) + 0.5 (oversight with limited authority) + 0.25 (limited experience) = 1.5 
Although historical U.S. public trust polling data can be easily found data back 
decades, consistently collected international polling data for public trust in government is 
not.  Thus, determining an average public trust number for the countries is limited by the 
available data.   The Edelman Trust Barometer provides the most consistent results for 
citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia in response to 
the question, “How much do you trust the government to do what is right.” Figure 1 
illustrates the results of the Edelman Trust Barometer for 2008-2015. 
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In order to mitigate the effects of natural fluctuations of public trust numbers, the 
average of the numbers from 2008-2015.  Figure 2 illustrates the average public trust 
numbers for each country over this time period. 
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Figure 2: Average Trust in Government 2008-2015 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
This review of the intelligence apparatus and oversight bodies of the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United States reveals commonalities, as well as 
differences amongst the nations.  As expected in democratic nations, the intelligence 
agencies have developed extensive and multi-layered oversight mechanisms including 
legislative review that sometimes requires the prior approval of activities, peer and 
judicial approval for implementation of intrusive techniques, and accountability to the 
executive branch governments in all of the countries.  
If the hypothesis for this chapter were correct, the lowest levels of public trust 
would be associated with the greatest intelligence oversight.  The United Kingdom 
(followed by the United States, Australia, and then Canada) would have the highest level 
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the intelligence oversight by countries and associating a score based on the authorities 
granted to each oversight entity, a different picture can be seen.  The following oversight 
scores clearly indicate that the United States possesses the most extensive oversight of 
the countries reviewed: 
1) United States                             1.5 
2) United Kingdom                       1.25 
3) Canada and Australia (tied)      1.0                                                                                           
So what does it all mean?  Clearly, the hypothesis for this essay was 
miscalculated or the methodology used for testing did not accurately reflect the oversight 
powers associated with each country.  Another reason for the discrepancy could lie in the 
countries chosen for comparison.  Comparison of intelligence services of between 
countries with democratic and authoritarian regimes would have likely been more 
appropriate. The choice of comparing similar western democratic governments might 
have resulted in public trust numbers that were too close for comparison, especially when 
considering potential margins of error with the data collection.  
Public trust polling in the United States goes back decades whereas the polling for 
this chapter is limited to the 2008-2015 timeframe.  The lack of comparable polling data 
(for the other countries reviewed) over more historic and consistent time period could 
have skewed the public trust numbers a couple of percentage points either way.  
Specifically, the polling data could have been unusually high or low in any of the 
countries due to isolated crisis or instances of national pride.   
 Future research of this topic should consider whether comparison should include 
the 116 countries with intelligence or security agencies or a larger subset of the 19 
37 
 
democratic countries.  Using a larger sub-set of less similar and democratic countries 
might include wider variations public trust numbers which allow for more definitive 
conclusions.  In addition, the larger country pool may provide enough data to allow for 
conclusions regarding the effect of changes in levels of oversight on the public trust 
polling numbers. 
 The accuracy of future research could be increased with the existence of regular 
and continuous polling, over an extended period of time that investigates the level of the 
public’s trust in the effectiveness of the intelligence community, as well as the public’s 
trust in the intelligence community’s respect for civil liberties and the nation’s laws.  As 
discussed in the public trust literature, the results are only as good as the polling pool and 
















Prior to the Edward Snowden’s release of classified information, the public debate 
surrounding the prosecution of individuals accused of disclosing classified information 
without authorization typically focused on issues involving the First Amendment, a 
citizens’ right-to-know, over-classification of government information, deterrence, 
selective prosecution, and appropriate legal remedies.  Snowden’s disclosures about mass 
surveillance programs under broad authorities granted under section 215 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) shocked the public and confirmed the suspicions of 
transparency and privacy rights’ groups.   Media outlets decried the perceived violation 
constitutional protections and questioned if USIC oversight had failed.
 54
  To answer that 
question, this chapter evaluated the effectiveness of USIC oversight effectiveness and 
presented recommendations for improvement.  
In order to evaluate the performance of the intelligence oversight committees, the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), it is important to understand the authorities and 
available means to execute their authorities.  The committees hold public hearings on 
intelligence issues to advocate for the public debate, as well as hold closed-door sessions 
for classified portions of the same debate or other topics.   The committees also have 
authority to investigate intelligence matters, which includes the power to compel witness 
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testimony or document production through congressional subpoena. In addition, the 
committees have authority to legislate, which means they have the authority to confer 
with constituents, special interest groups, and the USIC to craft legislation that 
constrains, empowers, or reforms the bodies the committees oversee. 
Currently, neither committee, HPSCI or SSCI, possess budgetary authority over 
the intelligence community which they oversee.  Members of each chamber’s 
Appropriations Committee sit on each intelligence committee; however, budgetary 
authority over the USIC is delegated to the Appropriations Committee itself.   The 
Appropriation’s budget authority is limited to passage of an overall budget as opposed to 
allotting specific amounts for targeted programs which would defund untenable programs 
and force the intelligence agencies to focus resources on activities deemed important to 
Congress.  Although HPSCI and SSCI lack budgetary authority, they have been entrusted 
with other powers that can be used to oversee the USIC.   
So, how can we judge the effectiveness of congressional oversight?  In her book, 
Zegart provides an innovative and comparative analysis of various Congressional 
oversight committees using data regarding committee meetings, legislation considered 
and legislation passed and committee experience.  Zegart’s analysis uses this data to 
determine if Congress is fulfilling the four roles of intelligence oversight: Policeman, 
Board of Directors, Coach and Ambassador.
55
  Zegart’s work overwhelmingly suggests 
that Congressional intelligence oversight can be described as sporadic and inconsistent 
with spikes in legislative activity in response to failures.  Rather than judging HPSCI and 
SSCI’s oversight of one or two programs disclosed by Snowden, this chapter follows 
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Zegart’s method of comparing legislative activity levels (hearings held, legislation 
considered/passed, and legislative success rates) of HPSCI and SSCI to other House and 
Senate committees.   
Overwhelmingly, the comparison reveals that HPSCI and SSCI’s level of 
legislative activity was less than the average of other committee activity levels.
56
  
Wishful thinking might lead one to hope the committees are executing their authorities 
with less activity, but realistically these percentages suggest that Congress has not spent 
enough time overseeing the USIC.   In addition to confirming the need for increased 
USIC oversight, this chapter expanded on and updated Zegart’s research, and provides 
recommendations for improving USIC oversight.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Jennifer Kibbe, government oversight of the USIC plays 
intelligence role is the most important based on the inability of the media to keep the 
government in check when it comes to intelligence.  The mere existence of oversight is a 
positive sign, especially when it comes to “mainly secret” activities in democratic states.   
Robust oversight is necessary to mitigate the chances of intelligence failures or scandals, 
but it also threatens the “secrecy” in which intelligence is based.  Good oversight is 
difficult to identify and is subjective to the person describing the mechanism.
57
      
As previously stated, the most important reason for intelligence oversight is the 
inherent secrecy of the subject.  In addition to overseeing the USIC, congressional 
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oversight committees also play an important in explaining and representing the USIC to 
the public, as well as improving the intelligence product.
58
  Public (or open hearings) 
provide the most useful tool in educating the public about the work of federal agencies.  
The classified nature of intelligence presents a unique challenge for HPSCI and SSCI to 
hold substantive hearings aimed at educating the public about national security threats 
and/or USIC efforts to neutralize those threats. .   
Between 1947 and 1975, over 200 bills aimed at reforming and/or increasing 
oversight of the USIC.
59
  As evidenced by the number of bills and oversight literature, the 
examples of the ineptitude of intelligence oversight and opinions of how to improve 
oversight are abundant.  Often cited as evidence of the committees’ ineptitude include 
their inability to pass Intelligence Authorization legislation between FY 2006-2009, the 
DOJ’s use of the Espionage Act of 1917 to investigate and prosecute leakers, and their 




The most notable recommendations for improving intelligence oversight were 
included in the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission.  The commission recommended either 
consolidating appropriation and authorization authority in HPSCI and SSCI or the 
creation of a joint standing committee on intelligence modeled after the Joint Committee 
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  However, the current partisan environment hinders the introduction 
and passage of legislation aimed at reforming intelligence oversight.  Partisanship and 
“turf wars” between the Appropriations Committees (which currently possess budgetary 
authority over the USIC) and HPSCI and SSCI have been cited as reasons congress has 
not reformed the current intelligence oversight structure.
62
   
With all these opinions about USIC oversight, one might think someone might 
suggest there was a solution or combination of solutions that could prevent intelligence 
failures and abuses.  Richard Betts argues intelligence failures are inevitable and 
describes thoughts to the contrary as illusory.
63
  However, the appropriate level of 
oversight can mitigate the potential for abuse and failure, ensure the vigorous 
investigation allegations of both, and promote systematic changes based on lessons 
learned to minimize the chance of recurrence.  The questions raised by the disclosures of 
Edward Snowden is whether the oversight committees have been effectively executing 
their authorities to ensure proper oversight and what, if anything, can be done to improve. 
Although the recommendations for oversight reform have merit, the examples of 
congressional dysfunction that form the basis for these proposals are based on 
generalities.   The basis for intelligence reform should be grounded in empirical evidence 
and proven models rather than opinions.  According to Kibbe, “the most influential 
model on intelligence oversight divides oversight activity into two metaphorical 
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categories: ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms.’”
64
  The metaphors, coined by Mathew D. 
McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, aptly compare the available means of conducting 
oversight to that of a policeman patrolling the streets or a firemen responding to a fire-
alarm.
65
  The framework and models used by McCubbins and Schwartz has become the 
foundation of significant research in the topic of intelligence oversight by researchers 
such as Loch K. Johnson and Zegart.   
Johnson and Zegart have used the “police-patrol” and “fire-alarm” metaphors in 
their scholarly worked aimed at identifying the shortcomings of congressional oversight, 
reasons for congress’ resistance to change and to support their recommendations for 
congressional oversight reform.   The “police-patrol” model uses consistent oversight 
monitoring to detect, remedy and deter inappropriate behavior whereas the “fire-alarm” 
model relies on the media, interest groups, or whistleblowers to alert congress and the 
public of potential violations.
66
   Although both forms of oversight have their benefits, 
“police-patrol” is the most effective means of oversight when combined with budgetary 
and authorization powers over the agencies.  “Fire-alarm” is considered the most time 
efficient for Congress where a considerable amount of their time must be dedicated the 
other issues (domestic and constituent) that aid in their re-election to office.
67
 
In “Secret Spy Agencies and a Shock Theory of Accountability,” Johnson 
describes what he terms as the “Shock Theory of Accountability.”  Johnson continues to 
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use the metaphors coined by McCubbins and Schwartz, but differs slightly from Zegart’s 
previous work on Congressional oversight.  Johnson’s analysis of intelligence 
accountability illustrates how recent intelligence failure or scandals have resulted in 
intense periods of oversight “patrolling” and remedial legislation aimed at preventing 
future lapses.  Johnson coins the term, “Shock Theory of Accountability,” to describe the 




Zegart dedicates a chapter of her book, Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United 
States Intelligence Community, to a comparative analysis between the activity of these 
oversight committees and the activity of other congressional committees between 1985 
and 2005.  The data presented clearly indicates a lack of activity by the committees, 
especially when compared to committees associated with domestic responsibilities.   
Zegart’s work overwhelmingly suggests that Congressional intelligence oversight can be 




After finding HPSCI and SSCI to be ineffectively executing their oversight 
authorities, Zegart attributes this ineffectiveness to a lack of Congressional and public 
interest.  Zegart finds a lack of experience and a lack of tenure on the committees, and a 
lack of incentive of members to volunteer for these assignments due to the lack of 
electoral effect.  Zegart concludes oversight expertise can be increased by tapping into 
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the legislator’s homegrown knowledge, altering rules to enhance on the job training (e.g. 
end HPSCI term limits and incentivize activity), and leverage congressional resources to 
enhance staff capability.
70
  Zegart’s suggestion that congressional oversight can be 
judged through committee meetings, legislation considered and legislation passed and 
committee experience provides an acceptable means to gauge committee effectiveness 
and served as the basis for the case studies in this chapter. 
After illustrating the ineptitude of intelligence oversight, Zegart presents statistics 
related to public interest groups and spending on intelligence lobbying in an attempt to 
correlate congressional dysfunction to a lack of public interest.   The statistics cited 
illustrate the lack of funds spent on intelligence lobbying (as a sub-set of defense 
lobbying), as well as a lack of Foreign Affairs interests groups.  In addition, compares the 
committee member assignments and committee staffing levels of HPSCI and SSCI to 
other congressional committees.  This comparison indicates less member experience and 
seniority for HPSCI and SSCI, as well as inadequate staffing levels.  As a result of her 
research, Zegart recommends improving the intelligence oversight committees by 
consolidating budgetary authority within HPSCI and SSCI, incentivizing member 
service, eliminating HPSCI term limits, and increasing staff personnel and capabilities.  
71
   
Zegart’s supporters cite her use of metrics (legislative activity, congressional 
staffing levels, lobbying dollars spent, etc.) to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
intelligence oversight committees in comparison to others committees and industries.  
William N. Nolte suggests these metrics provide empirical data which conclusively 
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illustrates an overall ineffectiveness of intelligence oversight, identifies potential causes 
of the performance, as well as potential solutions to be considered by Congress.
72
 
Zegart’s unique approach presents statistic-based reform recommendations rather than 
recommendations based on anecdotal, interest-biased, or even after-action review panels 
such as the 9/11 Commission. 
 Critics of Zegart’s methodology argue that the oversight effectiveness cannot be 
solely measured merely by the number of hearings or reports published.
73
  More 
important than the number of hearings or reports, is what transpires in the hearings or 
meetings or the content of the reports.  In addition to the hearings themselves, it is 
important to consider the congressional response hearings.  For example, what does the 
committee do with the information provided or the knowledge gained?  Does the 
committee request additional information (either written or through testimony)? These 
questions require an in depth analysis of oversight by issue rather than an evaluation of 
intelligence oversight as a whole.  However, “quality oversight requires a minimum level 
of attention, and comparison to other congressional oversight interests gives an important 
indicator of institutional attention.”
74
   
Although support of Zegart’s work include, Nolte notes that Zegart’s conclusions 
may be limited by her choice of records (1985-2005) and should be updated to determine 
if her findings still hold true.  Zegart’s choice of a five-year sampling data between 1985 
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and 2005 limited her dataset to five data points (1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005).  If 
Zegart’s findings would have been based on data for each Congress, her findings would 
have been more substantive based on 10 likely data points.  The recent disclosures by 
Snowden combined with the importance of intelligence oversight in our democracy, 
requires us to update and improve upon the small imperfections of Zegart’s work.   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
As previously stated, the purpose of this chapter is to characterize the 
effectiveness of HPSCI and SSCI at conducting oversight of the USIC.  In light of the 
disclosures by Snowden and based on the previous work by Zegart, I hypothesize that 
HPSCI and SSCI’s sporadic execution of oversight authorities continue to make the 
committees less effective than other congressional oversight committees. The sporadic 
oversight can likely be tied to the relative unimportance of intelligence to the American 
public, which ultimately leads to neglect in Congress. 
METHODOLOGY 
Although intelligence oversight in the US is more stringent than in other western 
democratic governments, the lack of appropriations authority prevents the USIC 
oversight apparatus from wielding the most important tool necessary for effective 
oversight.
75
  According to the literature reviewed for this essay and other sections of this 
portfolio, oversight structures can be graded on the strength of the body as defined by its 
founding authorities, as well as its effectiveness in executing its responsibilities using its 
authorities.  Without budgetary authority, analyzing the four roles of Zegart’s’ model for 
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intelligence oversight (Policeman, Board of Directors, Coach, and Ambassador) provides 
the most effective means to grade the institutions of USIC oversight.
 76
   However, closed 
hearings and other limitations associated with classified information prevent an 
evaluation of each of these four roles in an unclassified setting. 
Following McCubbins’ theory that police patrolling type of oversight was the 
most effective means to practice oversight, this chapter conducted a baseline analysis and 
comparison of data and statistics of other Congressional Committees to the performance 
of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees (HPSCI and SSCI).  The average 
committee performance served as a baseline of activity to be considered.  Legislative 
activity about the average would be considered “police-patrolling” and lower levels 
would be considered less effective and more likely to follow the “fire alarm” model. 
For the purposes of this chapter, committee performance was judged purely 
through a statistical comparison rather than focus on a specific topic covered by the 
committees.  Committee activity was defined as the number of committee hearings held 
(regardless of type); legislative activity in terms of bills introduced and considered by 
each committee, as well as the number of those bills becoming laws; and number of 
committee reports issued.  Although Zegart did not include committee reports in her 
work, they were included in this chapter to provide a more complete picture of committee 
activity because they are provide documentation of legislation measure reported for 
                                               
76
Amy B. Zegart, Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 2011), 31. 
49 
 
chamber action, detail oversight and investigative activities, reports of conference 
committees, and other committee activity reports.
77
 
As with Zegart’s work, this chapter relied on publically available U.S. 
government information to identify a baseline for the average activity level for HPSCI 
and SSCI to other legislative committees possessing oversight responsibilities and 
detailed a comparison between the average of activity and activity by the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees to rate their effectiveness of the committee.
78
  This 
chapter gathered data from the 99
th
 Congress to the 110
th
 Congress as opposed to a five-
year sampling (Dr. Zegart’s method).   The findings of this chapter validated Zegart’s 
previous findings with minor qualifications and suggestions that will help refine future 
scholarly research on USIC oversight.  
MAIN DISCUSSION 
 Zegart’s originality in using legislative activity statistics to illustrate inept 
congressional oversight received well deserved praise.  However, the use of five-year 
samplings over a twenty year time period raised questions of whether her findings would 
hold true over a longer period of time.  As previously stated, this purpose of this chapter 
was to test Zegart’s findings held true over the course of time and using more consistent 
metrics.  As with Zegart, this chapter reviewed legislative activity (Number of Committee 
Hearings and Reports issued, to determine the overall effectiveness of HPSCI and SSCI 
(in comparison to other committees) and attempted to tie this effectiveness to a lack of 
attention in Congress.   
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Nolte correctly questioned whether Zegart’s findings would hold true if a larger 
dataset were analyzed, but he fails to note her use of five or ten year samplings for a 
majority of her metrics.  In Zegart’s defense, she notes that her team reviewed her 
sampling to ensure events such as hearings related to the 9/11 attacks would not 
overinflate the numbers.  However, Zegart fails to account for the possibility the statistics 
of other committees were biased by events and failures under the jurisdiction of those 
committees. The Veterans Affairs’ scandal and the Affordable Care Act website rollout 
illustrate how oversight failures of other committees could inflate the responsible 
committees’ statistics.  In order to compensate for these anomalies, committee activities 
should be measured more consistently than a five-year sampling and over a greater period 
of time. 
The data collected (illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2) clearly indicates that  SSCI 
holds fewer hearings than other committees
79
, and both HPSCI and SSCI issue fewer 
committee reports, introduce and consider less legislation, and ultimately have less 
legislation introduced (by the committees) become enacted laws as a by-product of 
introducing less legislation. Although SSCI held fewer hearings, the committee appeared 
to be quite active with numerous on-the-record and off-the-record briefings during each 
Congress.  SSCI recorded 106 on-the-record briefings and interviews, as well as 
numerous off-the-record briefings in addition in addition to the 35 hearings held during 
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  During the 106
th
 Congress, SSCI recorded 17 on-the-record 
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  (1985 - 1986) 84 95 70 123 44 84 104  102 
100
th
  (1987 - 1988) 108 125 96 109 39 115 103 * 
101
st
  (1989 - 1990) 110 166 95 111 53 131 119 83 
102
nd
  (1991 - 1992) 111 127 77 109 84 138 153 81 
103
rd
  (1993 - 1994) 74 152 74 119 55 162 124 92 
104
th
  (1995 - 1996) 77 93 40 79 56 74 74 102 
105
th
  (1997 - 1998) 80 138 46 60 62 102 51 77 
106
th
  (1999 - 2000) 88 107 63 63 101 70 89 69 
107
th
  (2001 - 2002) 64 157 65 74 65 115 103 38 
108
th
  (2003 - 2004) 85 45 40 63 119 105 61 16 
109
th
  (2005 - 2006) 76 133 34 78 80 170 63 35 
110
th
  (2007-2008) 83 29 21 100 71 153 75 82 
111
th
  (2009 - 2010) 82 102  * 45 88 143 39 79 
112
th
 (2011 – 2012) 




 (2013 – 2014) 
* * * * * * * 
111 
Table 1: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Consistently Holds Fewer Hearings than Other House Committees, 99
st
 Congress – 113 Congress.
82
 
Although legislative activity statistics indicate HPSCI and SSCI are associated with lower levels of legislative activity, 
the legislative success rate for HPSCI and SSCI far exceeds that of other committees as well as the average success rate for 
each Congress.  In fact, SSCI’s legislation success rate is 125% of the committee average and HPSCI’s legislation success rate 
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is 225% of the committee average.  The effect of divided (or unified) government appears to have little effect on the average 
legislative success rates in congress.  Although the average legislative success rate is slightly higher for periods of divided 
government as opposed to periods of unified government, periods of divided government experience both the highest and 

































  (1989-1990) 5.64% 5.88% 0% 6 * 5 * DIVIDED 
102
nd
 (1991-1992) 5.08% 14.29% 17% 9 * 4 * DIVIDED 
103
rd
 (1993-1994) 4.82% 25.00% 6% 3 * 2 * DIVIDED 
104
th
 (1995-1996) 4.22% 25.00% 11% 6 14% 6 22% UNIFIED 
105
th
 (1997-1998) 4.42% 6.25% 29% 6 22% 4 18% DIVIDED 
106
th
 (1999-2000) 5.57% 27.27% 0% 4 16% 3 16% DIVIDED 
107
th
 (2001-2002) 3.55% 23.81% 13% 2 8% 3 14% DIVIDED 
108
th
  (2003-2004) 4.72% 5.88% 11% 5 16% 4 12% UNIFIED 
109
th
 (2005-2006) 3.69% 9.09% 0% 6 27% 4 19% UNIFIED 
110
th
 (2007-2008) 3.28% 6.82% 0% 4 18% 5 19% DIVIDED 
111
th
 (2009-2010) 2.82% 2.17% 0% **** 12% **** 8% UNIFIED 
112
th
 (2011-2012) 2.31% 16.67% 9% **** 49% **** 23% DIVIDED 
113
th
 (2013-2014) 2.78% 1.61% 17% **** 27% **** 28% DIVIDED 
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scholarly work on the legislative process. 
Zegart illustrates a lack of public interest in intelligence through superficial 
analysis of interest groups and lobbying dollars spent by industry.
84
  Although her 
conclusions regarding the public’s interest are correct, her choice of limiting her analysis 
to these statistics is curious.  With her first dataset, Zegart’s compiled the list of 
organized and registered interest groups, and subjectively identified the ones she felt 
could likely be involved in intelligence as a means to quantify the number of foreign 
affairs interest groups.  This process resulted in statistics indicating Foreign Affairs 
Interest Groups accounted for only 4.4% of the total number.
85
 
Zegart correlates congressional inaction to a lack of public interest using statistics 
from public interest groups and money spent on lobbying.   For public interest groups, 
Zegart cites examples of Sister Cities International and Gays and Lesbians in Foreign 
Affairs as “unlikely to be involved in intelligence.”
86
  A more in depth evaluation of each 
group’s charter and review of the group’s activities would be needed to solidify Zegart’s 
conclusions.  This subjective assessment disregards the circumstances where these 
associations could be involved with lobbying or public promotion of positions related to 
intelligence.   
Similarly, Zegart relies on lobbying dollars spent by industry to support the lack 
of public interest argument.  For her analysis, Zegart subjectively combined industries 
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identified in the statistics she cited from the Center for Responsive Politics to fit her 
narrative.   This aggregation of industries muddles the facts behind the statistics.   
Specifically, Zegart extrapolates the Intelligence lobbying must only be a subset of the 
5% of lobbying dollars spent on the Defense Industry.  In this instance, it appears Zegart 
included Intelligence under the Defense Industry because almost its entire budget is 
hidden inside the Defense Budget. 
Zegart’s methodology of viewing intelligence-related lobbying as a subset of 
Defense spending does not account for the role of telecoms and other electronic 
communication carriers in intelligence collection.  In response to the Snowden 
disclosures, Yahoo and Facebook executives revealed the companies complied with 
lawful requests for records or access to information but also fought against request the 
companies deemed unlawful.  The executives also revealed classified legal process 
prevented the companies from being more transparent with their consumers.
87
  Clearly, 
this scenario illustrates the potential for these types of companies to lobby congress on 
behalf of legislation involving data collection and retention, transparency, and privacy 
constituent rights.  Further illustrating this point is the fact that Defense sector lobby 
ranked tenth of the measured sectors between 1998 and 2015, whereas the 
Communications/Electronics sector ranked fifth.
88
   Thus, the amount of money spent 
lobbying on behalf of intelligence or intelligence related issues could be higher than 
assumed when viewed outside the realm of the Defense subset. 
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This ‘pre-Snowden’ mentality disregards the public and non-public relationship 
companies or industries may have in the machinery of the USIC.
89
  Although her 
conclusions regarding dollars spent on Intelligence lobbying is correct, an exhaustive 
analysis of where the lobbying dollars were spent would be necessary to confirm her 
assessment.  This analysis would include a comparison of lobbying dollars and contact 
reports for specific intelligence related legislation, as well as an in depth analysis of each 
lobbying report filed for each Congressmen and Senator before, during and subsequent 
their assignment on one of the intelligence committees. 
Unless Zegart acknowledged the limitations of these statistics, she could have 
offered additional data confirming a lack of public interest.  Specifically, Zegart should 
have caveat the use of her data and then provided historical national election exit polling 
data to illustrate the absence of Intelligence or Government Oversight as a prominent 
voter issue.  This date could have showed empirical evidence illustrating a potential 
reason for congressional inaction and/or lack of attention. 
Zegart indicated congressional leaders did not spend as much time on intelligence 
oversight because the work on these committees took time away from constituent issues 
and thus hurt re-election campaigns.  In essence, Congressman representing rural or 
industrial districts preferred to spend time on agricultural and trade issues which affected 
their constituent’s everyday life.  Based on the classified nature of most of the work on 
intelligence oversight, Congressmen are prevented from the type of credit-claiming that 
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members of other committees can do to illustrate their work on behalf of their 
constituents.  
  Table 3:  Most Important Issues in National Elections
90
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 Data: 2014 http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/exit-polls-show-economy-tops-voters-concerns-
n241426, , 2012 http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/06/exit-polls-top-issues-for-voters/,  2010 
National Election Year Polling Organization Most Important Issues for Voters 
2014 NBC Economy                         44% 
Healthcare                       25% 
Illegal Immigration         14%       
Foreign Policy                 13% 
2012 CNN Economy                         60% 
Healthcare                       17% 
Federal Budget Deficit    17%          
Foreign Policy                   4% 
2010 CNN Economy                         52%        
Deficit                               8% 
Healthcare                         8% 
Illegal Immigration           8% 
Education                          8% 
2008 CNN Economy                         62% 
Iraq                                  10% 
Healthcare                         9% 
Terrorism                          9% 
2006 CNN Iraq                                  49% 
Terrorism                         46% 
Economy                         33% 
Illegal Immigration         29% 
Moral Issues                    25% 
2004 CNN Moral Issues                    22% 
Economy                         20% 
Terrorism                        19% 
Iraq                                  15% 
Healthcare                         8% 
2002 USA Today Economy                         25% 
Potential War in Iraq        25% 
Terrorism                         14% 
Social Security/Medicare 11%  
Education                         11% 
Healthcare                         9% 
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As evident from the historical national election exit polling in Table 3, the issues 
of intelligence, congressional performance, intelligence oversight, or privacy rights are 
never mentioned as any of the major voter issues.  The polling data appears to indicate 
voters value issues they perceive to affect them directly such as the economy, which is 
affected by employment, immigration, health care, and other moral issues.  However, 
careful review of the exit polls indicates the questionnaires for the polls actually provided 
choices for the ‘most important issue” and none of the polls included choices for and 
indicates the polling methodology provided the respondents with the ability to choose 
issues of intelligence, congressional performance, intelligence oversight, or privacy 
rights.  
 Limiting the response choices for national exit polling questions forces the 
respondent’s to decide which of the declared issues is the most important to them and 
may prevent additional relevant and/or fringe issues from being identified.  Although this 
methodology potentially prevents intelligence related issues from being identified as most 
important issues, other polling suggests that intelligence or civil rights issues are not 
important in national elections.  According to a recent Pew Survey, the public’s lack of 
interest in intelligence oversight may also be attributed to an ignorance of who is 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2010/the.issues/ 2008 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/04/exit.polls/,  2006 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/special/issues/ 2004 






   This lack of interest or ignorance of the public regarding government 
programs is not surprising in light of comments made by Jonathan Gruber, key architect 
of the Affordable Care Act.  Gruber admitted the law was passed by exploiting the 
ignorance of the American public.
92
  One can only wonder how an uninformed public can 
hold Congress accountable for overseeing the USIC, which is an entity in which few 
people have experience with or knowledge of and even less feel any connection with.  
This sentiment rings true in light of Gruber’s comments about healthcare, which is a topic 
that affects everyone directly. 
Figure 3: Congressional Job Approval Ratings Trend (1974-Present)
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Although Congressional job approval rating have plummeted since their historic 
highs in the wake of the 9/11 terror, the current disapproval ratings are associated with 
partisan politics, political gamesmanship, gridlock, and economic issues.  None of the 
responses recorded by Pew attributed the respondent’s disapproval of Congress to 
failures of intelligence oversight or intelligence matters.
 
 Moreover, overhauling the 
USIC or the USIC oversight structure, or even increasing privacy rights were not 
included in the top recommendations of those polled on how to fix Congress.
94
 
 In addition to legislative activity levels, Zegart attributed some of the 
congressional ineptitude to the size of the HPSCI or SSCI staffs.  As evident from Table 
4 below, HPSCI and SSCI staff size still lag behind those of the Banking and Armed 
Services committees.  Although HPSCI and SSCI staffing levels have expanded and 
contracted over time, the current levels indicate an expansion between 1977 and 2014.
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Table 4: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
Consistently possess fewer professional staff members than other committees. 
 
 Although committee staffing levels certainly affect HPSCI and SSCI’s ability to 
execute their duties, data collected by the Sunlight Foundation suggests high staff 
turnover rates compounds staffing issue at a minimum.  As illustrated in Table 5 below, 
HPSCI is one of only three House committees possessing a retention rate of less than 
40%.   The Sunlight Foundation suggests that high turnover rate likely causes the 
committee to be less effective at executing their duties, and increasing reliant on lobbyists 
to help analyze and draft legislation.
95
   
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the number of registered 
lobbyists increased from 10,405 in 1998 to 11,781 in 2014 (11.7% increase), and dollars 
spent on lobbying increased from $1.45 Billion to $3.23 billion (122.8% increase) during 
the same time period.  Over the same period and based on the number of clients, the top 
issues lobbied included Federal Budget/Appropriations, Health, Defense, Taxes, and 
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House of Representatives Committee Staff Levels 1977 - 2014 
 1977 1987 1997 2007 2014 % Change 1977 - 
Armed Services 40 61 55 53 66 65% 
Banking 51 74 58 43 68 33% 
Intelligence 23 17 24 39 32 39% 
Senate Committee Staff Levels 1977 - 2014 
 1977 1987 1997 2007 2014 % Change 1977 - 
Armed Services 32 54 59 51 49 53% 
Banking 46 40 37 47 47 2% 
Intelligence 40 38 30 34 41 3% 
62 
 
Transportation.  From 2005-2014, the bills receiving the most lobbying efforts involved 
Healthcare, Employment issues, Federal Budget/Appropriations, and Disaster Relief.  
None of these bills included Intelligence related matters.
96
  If the Sunlight Foundation’s 
assertion is correct, diminished staffing levels, high turnover rates amongst committee 
staffs, and a lack of intelligence related lobbying spending severely limit HPSCI and 
SSCI’s ability to execute their authorities.  Researchers with the Sunlight Foundation 
noted common themes amongst committees/members having lower staff turnover 
included higher salaries.  In addition, senior members and democratic members were 
more likely to have higher retention rates than junior and/or republican members.
97
  










Natural Resources 64 23 35.9% 
Education & The 
Workforce 
79 30 38.0% 
Intelligence 36 14 38.9% 
Oversight & 
Government Reform 
108 44 40.7% 
Transportation & 
Infrastructure 
83 34 41.0% 
Energy & 
Commerce 
114 50 43.9% 
Ethics 22 10 45.5% 
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Financial Services 81 38 46.9% 
Veterans' Affairs 34 16 47.1% 
Science, Space & 
Technology 
65 31 47.7% 
Homeland Security 67 32 47.8% 
Small Business 31 15 48.4% 
House 
Administration 
47 23 48.9% 
Appropriations 226 112 49.6% 
Foreign Affairs 81 41 50.6% 
Armed Services 68 36 52.9% 
Agriculture 49 26 53.1% 
Rules 35 19 54.3% 
Judiciary 84 46 54.8% 
Ways And Means 79 44 55.7% 
Budget 42 27 64.3% 
Joint Committee On 
Taxation 
68 56 82.4% 
Table 5: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence rates amongst the highest staff turnover 
rates for Congressional committees.
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Zegart attributed the lack of incentives for high ranking members, or Movers and 
Shakers as she termed them, to seek HPSCI and SSCI assignments.  For the period 
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analyzed by Zegart (1977 – 2007), the number of Movers and Shakers declined.  In the 
years since (2007-2015), the number has risen dramatically.  Although the reason for the 
increase is unclear at this time, the possibilities include the natural fluctuation in numbers 
or an increased focus on USIC oversight predicated by the Snowden disclosures. 
 
Table 6: The number of movers and shakers on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and Senate Select Committee have fluctuated over time. 
 Zegart also attributes committee assignment term limits as an issue that prevents 
members from gaining the necessary experience in intelligence matters to effectively 
execute their duties.  The problem with this argument is that SSCI removed term limits 
years ago and HPSCI currently employs a term limit of four terms (8 years).   If Zegart’s 
assertion were true, how could the USG expect almost every other USIC agency to 
effectively execute its mission when the agency heads and executive leadership 
management retire or move on?  There have been four Secretaries of Defense and six 




% of Movers and 
Shakers 
SSCI 2015 13 19 68% 
2007 5 15 33% 
1997 9 19 47% 
1987 11 15 73% 
1977 6 17 35% 
HPSCI 2015 6 21 29% 
2007 5 20 25% 
1997 7 16 44% 
1987 8 17 47% 
1977 6 13 46% 
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CIA Directors, but yet those agencies continue to accomplish their mission. Why can 
these bureaucracies continue to function, but congressional oversight fails?  The reason 
these agencies/departments have been able to continue functioning at a high level with 
this excessive turnover is likely due the professional staff under their command.   
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
Although intelligence failures are inevitable, oversight done correctly can mitigate 
the potential for abuse and failure.  Zegart’s analysis of the difficulties in analyzing 
oversight is spot-on.   Government oversight could mean entirely different things to civil 
rights groups or supporters of open-government than it does intelligence officers or even 
judges.  This chapter’s expansion of Zegart’s statistical analysis of intelligence oversight 
confirmed her previous findings indicating USIC oversight was less active, and thus less 
effective, than other congressional oversight committees. However, this essay provides 
additional data to support her findings as well as suggest additional research.   
As the literature review illustrated, the most effective tool in oversight is 
budgetary authority.  Until Congress drafts and approves legislation to consolidate 
budgetary authority with the intelligence committees, efforts must be made to improve 
oversight within the current framework.  With the exception of unauthorized disclosures 
(and sometimes authorized) to the media, the classified nature of intelligence also 
precludes the media from being an effective tool in oversight. 
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 As the research has shown, it is impossible to know or even estimate the number 
of every ad hoc meetings or briefings, or communications amongst the oversight 
apparatus that occurs outside the normal course of business
99
 and thus, evaluating 
congressional oversight is limited to the publically available and documented 
information.  Thus, HPSCI and SSCI must improve their focus on transparency to include 
increased public hearings, as well as increase the tracking and publication of committee 
activities associated with their oversight duties.  Beyond holding the USIC accountable, 
transparency in oversight activities can help educate the public and spur public debate on 
intelligence which had been lacking before the Snowden disclosures. 
Zegart’s work tied the perceived lack of Congressional oversight to a variety of 
factors revolving around the relative unimportance of intelligence matters to national 
elections.  As evidence, Zegart cited fewer dollars spent on lobbying Intelligence-related 
issues, less Intelligence interest groups, less movers and shakers on the committees, 
fewer incentives for committee members, and other matters as evidence of why 
committee members do not spend the appropriate time dedicated to their work on HPSCI 
and SSCI.  This chapter’s review of exit polling for historical national elections only 
confirms Zegart’s assessment of the relative unimportance of Intelligence to voters, 
lobbyists, and congressional members seeking re-election.  
 Zegart’s conclusions about the reasons for the lack of attention are correct; 
however, her assessment of the most effective means to remedy the situation should be 
refined.  Zegart mentions increasing committee staff levels in her recommendations for 
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improving oversight, but she considers committee member experience and attention to 
committee work to be more important.  I disagree.  Most of the oversight workload is 
handled by the committee staff.  In order to improve the consistency and effectiveness of 
USIC oversight, Congress should focus on increasing committee staff levels and 
capabilities, as well as increasing staff retention rates for HPSCI and SSCI.  As the 
Sunlight Foundation suggests, higher salaries or other monetary compensation provides 
the easiest means to increase and retain committee staff.  However, this would only be a 
temporary solution since other committees would likely follow suit.  Therefore, future 
research of intelligence oversight should focus on USIC committee staffing issues.  
 The public reporting of congressional legislative activity is slightly delayed and at 
times inconsistent, but the increase in SSCI hearings during the 113
th
 Congress could be 
indicative of patterns associated with McCubbins description of Congressional 
Intelligence Oversight as the “fire alarm” model.  If true, we will continue to witness an 
increase in oversight activity in this period after Snowden’s disclosure and then an 
eventual decline.  If the public demands more USIC oversight by its Congressional 
leaders, we will see an increased level of activity that will become the new normal.   
Although the disclosures occurred almost two years ago, it is likely too soon to 
quantify the effect on lobbying, interest groups, or even on national elections.  The defeat 
of Senator Mark Udall (D-Colorado) in the 2014 mid-term elections may signal it will be 
more of the same with intelligence matters and government oversight of the USIC not 
even entering into the voter’s mind at the polls.  Senator Udall, along with Senator Ron 
68 
 
Wyden (D-Oregon), has been too of the staunchest supports of NSA reforms and USIC 
transparency.   
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CHAPTER THREE:  The non-Deterrent Effect of 








 Although today’s security and counterintelligence officials may not make jokes 
about killing journalists as Sherman did, the publication of classified intelligence by 
media outlets have become a thorn in their side.  With the introduction of the twenty-four 
hour news cycle, daily perusal of almost any media outlet’s publication will encounter at 
least one article attributed to “unidentified government sources” or “unidentified 
intelligence officials” and purportedly containing classified intelligence.  The 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a media outlet is referred to as a 
“media leak.”  The perceived increase in prosecutions of individuals allegedly 
responsible for media leaks by President Barack Obama’s Administration generated a 
political firestorm with security and counterintelligence officials frantically investigating 
each leak and looking to ways to stop the unauthorized disclosures on one side and 
advocates of free speech and government transparency on the other.  
 Security and counterintelligence officials argue the alleged unauthorized 
“I hate newspapermen. They come 
into camp and pick up their camp 
rumors and print them as facts. I 
regard them as spies, which, in truth, 
they are. If I killed them all there would 
be news from Hell before breakfast.” 




disclosure of classified information to the media (or anyone for that matter) causes grave 
harm to our national security.  In a speech delivered to the Heritage Foundation, 
Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Representative Pete Hoekstra, 
clearly stated that “some of the worst damage done to our intelligence community has 
come not from penetration by spies, but from unauthorized leaks by those with access to 
classified information.”
100
  In response to the recent publication of thousands of classified 
documents on the WikiLeaks’ website and other unauthorized disclosures, the Office of 
Management and Budget issued Memorandum M-11-06 directing “departments and 
agencies that handle classified national security information to establish assessment 
teams (consisting of counterintelligence, security, and information assurance experts) to 
review their implementation of safeguarding procedures.”
101
 
 Individuals condemning the prosecution of individuals accused of providing 
classified information without authorization includes scholars, media representatives, 
lawyers and advocacy groups.  Although each group or person has their own reason for 
condemning prosecution of media leak cases, former Assistant Attorney General Kenneth 
L. Wainstein alleges defense attorneys typically challenge the government’s case by 
“invoking everything from first amendment principals to allegations of improper 
classification to arguments that their client’s alleged leak was actually an authorized 
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disclosure within the scope of his or her official duties.”
102
   There are also individuals 
who believe individuals who leak classified information should be sanctioned, but 
mitigate the crime by saying most “leakers” are well-intentioned government servants 
who did not intend to harm the national interests.  This group proposes fines or 
administrative actions including the loss of security clearance as the suggested 
punishment.  Although the leaking of information to the press is nothing new, the recent 
and frequent rise in the number of media leaks and subsequent increase in prosecutions is 
cause for alarm on both sides.    
In this chapter, I attempt to sort out verify the claims of media and transparency 
advocates that prosecuting media leaks stifles freedom of speech and deters would be 
leakers and whistleblowers from coming forward.  I initiated my research by 
investigating deterrence and theories of deterrence.  In addition to defining deterrence 
and reviewing theory, I also researched the “anatomy” of a media leak investigation to 
understand the process by which they are referred, investigated, and potentially 
prosecuted.  By understanding these topics, I hypothesized prosecuting media leaks 
would not have a deterrent effect.   
Using publically available statistics illustrated in Table 7 and 8, I effectively 
proved the likelihood of being identified as a leaker was less than 8% and the likelihood 
of being prosecuted was even less.  Moreover, I reviewed several of the recent publicized 
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to cases to understand to determine whether the cases matched the criteria for deterring 
would be leakers at least according to current deterrence theory.  Application of 
deterrence theory to the case studies clearly indicate that prosecuting individuals accused 
of leaking classified information to the media does not meet the thresholds of having a 
deterrent effect on would be leakers.  If anything, the prosecution of alleged leakers most 
likely provides a roadmap would would-be leakers to avoid getting caught. 
DETERRENCE THEORY 
 With the media frenzy created by the perceived and recent increase in 
prosecutions of individuals accused of providing classified information to media representatives 
without authorization, one must ask himself/herself if prosecution of those accused of this 
crime sufficiently deters others from engaging in similar illegal behavior.  Although the 
topic of media leaks presents multiple research opportunities, the focus of this analysis is 
the deterrent effect of recent media leak prosecutions.  To conduct the described analysis, 
this chapter begins with a historical summary of law enforcement deterrence and 
subsequently reviews available scholarly literature on the topics of deterrence, effective 
prosecution, organizational bureaucracies, and procedures for protecting classified 
information at trial.  
The earliest literature describing the subject of law enforcement in economic 
terms can be traced to the eighteenth century writings of Montesquieu (1748), Cesare 
Beccaria (1767), and Jeremy Bentham (1789).  Without explanation, scholarship 
associating law enforcement and economics laid dormant until the publication of Gary S. 
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Becker’s Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.
 103
  Although Becker’s 
analysis of law enforcement in terms of economics formed the basis for scholarship from 
which most deterrence and optimal enforcement studies are derived, most criminologists 
accept Beccaria’s assertion in Of Crimes and Punishment (1764) that potential criminals 
will be deterred only if punishment for commission of a crime is administered quickly, 
with certainty, proportionately and publicly.
104
 
 Recognizing Beccaria’s “four pillars” represented an idealist view of criminal 
deterrence, Becker developed formulas using input data contained in crime rates, prison 
population, and the monetary costs associated with law enforcement and prosecution to 
identify the social cost of criminal behavior.  Since its publication in 1968, Becker’s 
representation of the economic costs associated with illegal behavior and law 
enforcement provided a framework for resource allocation and policy debate to combat 
criminal activity based on factors.
105
   By representing law enforcement in economic 
terms, Becker put a price tag on Beccaria’s “four pillars.”   
 Becker’s comprehensive study of law enforcement is the basis for studies in 
optimal law enforcement whereas researchers or politicians attempt to optimize resource 
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allocation based on net social cost identified by comparing the cost of enforcement with 
economic loss of particular crimes.  Although worth mentioning, the subject of optimal 
enforcement is tangential to the research question of this paper.  Disregarding the 
economics of optimal law enforcement, Becker’s research verified Beccaria’s assertion 
that by probability and severity of punishment deters potential criminals.  Over the last 
four decades, scholars have debated Becker’s the applicability of the data used in 
Becker’s analysis and the conclusions reached.  Becker’s economic analysis has been 
criticized and supported through scholarly research in the fields of criminal deterrence 
and law enforcement.   
Becker’s analysis is limited by the used of incomparable crime figures.  In 
Becker’s essay, input figures include crime rates, economic costs and incarcerations rates 
for robbery, burglary and larceny.  Becker correctly identifies robbery as crime against a 
person and burglary and larceny as property crimes without commenting on the possible 
effect of comparing dissimilar crimes.  Although outside the purview of this review, one 
can reasonably assume the incarceration rate and length of prison sentence for a crime 
against a person is higher than a property crime based on the likelihood of the perpetrator 
can be identified by a victim witness.  Therefore, subsequent research which re-analyzes 
the Beckerian model is limited by the same inputs.   
 Although outside the scope of this analysis, it is worth noting that Becker’s inputs 
for cost of law enforcement are limited by the era of his study.  Although costs associated 
with law enforcement have certainly inflated since 1968, the evolution of social media 
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and the founding of neighborhood watches and watchdog groups such as the Guardian 
Angels and Perverted-Justice allow law enforcement to more effectively prioritize 
resources.   
Since Becker’s application of economic theory to deterrence in 1968, scholars 
focused research on three of Beccaria’s “four pillars” to determine which one most 
effectively deters would-be criminals: severity, certainty or celerity.  To date, there has 
been limited, if any, research on the deterrent effect of publicity in deterring illegal 
behavior.  In order to determine which, if any, of the pillars produces a significant 
deterrent effect, it is necessary to evaluate scholarly literature published since Becker’s 
essay. 
 As part of their research into the deterrent effect of perceived severity, Grasmick 
and Bryjak identified twelve studies measuring the perceived certainty and perceived 
severity of legal sanctions (Anderson et al.: Bailey and Lott; L. Cohen; Jensen and 
Erickson; Kraut; Meier and Johnson; Minor; Silberman; Teevan, a,b,c; Waldo and 
Chiricos).  Based on their evaluation of the data contained in these studies, Grasmick and 
Bryjak determined only Kraut’s study identified any link between perceived severity and 
deterrence.
106
   Grasmick and Bryjak noted that “although some effort has been devoted 
to refining the measurement of perceived certainty of punishment, no such attempt has 
been made to develop a theoretical and empirically sound measure of perceived 
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  Rather than using incarceration rates and crime statistics as Becker did in 
1968, Grasmick and Bryak noted current deterrence scholarship utilized surveys (verbal 
and written) of would-be criminals to determine their knowledge of current legal 
sanctions and their perception of expected sanctions given a particular crime.  In 
particular, Grasmick and Bryak noted the majority of the research regarding perceived 
severity produced inconsistent results based on the subjective nature of the questions   
 Based on the findings of their research, Grasmick and Bryak hypothesized “the 
severity of punishment (S) is inversely related to involvement in illegal behavior (l), but 
only among those people who perceived the certainty of arrest to be relatively high.”
108
  
To test their hypothesis, the pair conducted interviews of four hundred randomly selected 
individuals and interviewed them regarding their perceptions of legal sanctions.  Rather 
than asking respondents if arrest would result in a jail sentence, Grasmick and Bryak 
requested respondents to imagine the likely sentence for a crime (theft, illegal gambling, 
tax cheating, hurting someone, littering, illegal fireworks, and drunken driving) and then 
asked how much of an imposition the anticipated sentence would cause in their life.  By 
personalizing the research question to the respondent’s life, Grasmick and Bryak 
removed the subjectivity of a jail sentence.  Ultimately, Grasmick and Bryak concluded 
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that perceived severity of punishment is high amongst those who believed the certainty of 
punishment is high. 
 Grasmick and Bryak’s findings are based on analysis of responses to the 
perceived severity of sanction based on hypothetical arrest for a variety of property 
crimes.  While the questions from the data section of their study were altered to avoid 
perceived flaws in previous studies, the phasing resulted in the dependence of the severity 
of punishment on the certainty of punishment.  The described dependence limits the 
study’s ability to ultimately determine if either certainty of punishment or severity of 
punishment is a more effective deterrent.  
Based on their analysis of previous research, Maxwell and Gray determined 
significant research indicated criminals were first deterred by the perceived certainty of 
punishment and then by the perceived severity of punishment but only if the would-be 
offender perceived potential activity would result in certain punishment.
109
  Maxwell and 
Gray determined studies examining the perceived certainty of sanctions are limited in 
“establishing the time-order between perceptions of the certainty of punishment and 
criminal behaviors” and “in using samples that were not generalizable to the offending 
population.”
110
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In order to identify the deterrent effect of perceived certainty of punishment, 
Maxwell and Gray analyzed data from Intensive Supervision Probation program where 
inmates consisted of individuals who were previously convicted of either drug or 
property crimes. Maxwell and Gray queried respondents to determine the likelihood of 
failure enrolled in this program.  To account for the time-order issue Maxwell and Gray 
perceived to limit previous studies, their study evaluated the respondents’ perception as 
to how many failed drug tests would be allowed at the start of the program, possibility of 
a savvy person to pass the mandatory drug tests, and their attitude towards requirements 
of the program.  Based on the respondent’s enrollment in the legal system as a 
probationer, the threat of sanction was a reality as opposed to previous studies where the 
certainty of punishment was merely theoretical.
111
 
 The result of Maxwell and Gray’s research was far from certain.   Although the 
research indicated a deterrent effect of the perceived certainty of punishment, the actual 
effect was biased by the variables of race, ethnicity and age. Ultimately, Maxwell and 
Gray’s research identified the need for further research on the topic accounts for the 
variant effects of demographics. 
 Maxwell and Gray eliminated the perceived theoretical limitation of previous 
studies by using a test group consisting of individuals in a program where failure results 
in guaranteed sanction absent increasing severity of punishment.  While relevant to drug 
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treatment or other rehabilitation programs, the study is limited in its applicability to 
deterrence studies for involving individuals outside of the criminal process.  
 As a result of his research into the possible deterrent effects in death penalty 
cases, Bailey noted previous studies failed to include the deterrent effect of celerity or 
timeliness of administering sanctions.  By ignoring the potential deterrent effect of 
celerity in death penalty cases, Bailey identified a possible bias in previous studies.  In 
addition, Bailey determined the results of some studies were biased based on the 
inclusion of data from states where the death penalty is illegal.
112
 Therefore, Bailey 
focused his research and analysis on the deterrent effect of celerity in death penalty cases 
in states where the sanction is legal. 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics for murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter were used as indicators of capital homicide rates.  Bailey identified the 
certainty of executions using averages from three compilations of execution rates and the 
celerity of executions using average median time between sentencing and execution.  Six 
socio-demographic factors were used to control for possible ambiguity. 
 Analysis of data collected by Bailey revealed a negligible deterrent effect of 
severity and certainty of punishment and absolutely no deterrent effect of celerity of 
punishment in death penalty case.  Bailey acknowledges the results of his work confirms 
the accuracy of earlier studies.  In mitigation, Bailey identifies the infrequent use of the 
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death penalty and the length of time between sentencing and execution as the likely 
reason for negative deterrent effects.
113
 
 Unlike previous research, Bailey correctly limits his input data to statistics from 
states where the death penalty is legal.  Although Bailey recognizes possibly limitations 
created through his input of data including the time between sentencing and execution, he 
does not propose another timeframe he considers useful in the study of celerity.   
Although much of Bailey’s research into law enforcement deterrence focuses on 
the deterrent effect of the death penalty, he wisely researches different possibilities for its 
deterrent effect.  Unlike the review described above, Bailey alleges, “The deterrent effect 
of criminal law is dependent upon communication to the public of the threat and 
application of sanctions.”
114
  Bailey focused his research on the media attention given to 
executions and its perceived effect on homicide rates.   
  Bailey’s analysis of previous research indicated homicide rates were previously 
compared to execution publicity in newspapers or print media.   Statistics collected 
indicated individual most likely to commit capital offenses received news by watching 
television and not print media.  Therefore, Bailey argued previous research was invalid.  
To make his research relevant to the times, Bailey’s data included statistics on television 
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coverage of executions versus homicide rates corresponding to the described coverage.  
Bailey concluded the publicity of executions did not have a deterrent effect on homicide 
rates.  Regardless of the graphic nature of the coverage, Bailey determined the television 
coverage actually showed execution is neither certain or timely.
115
 
 While statistics indicating individuals most likely to commit a capital crime 
received news updates from television broadcast guided Bailey’s research, Bailey did not 
account for the sub-set of this demographic that actually watches television news 
broadcast.  While more relevant than previous research conducted using publication 
statistics for print media, Bailey’s lack of accounting this sub-set of would-be criminals 
that actually watch television news broadcast.  In addition, the internet has overtaken 
television as the most watched source of news coverage since the publication of Bailey’s 
work.  
 Based on the lack of resources, effective prosecution of criminals allows law enforcement 
entities to allocate resources accordingly.   While not every case investigated results in charges 
filed, the government’s goal should be a one-hundred percent conviction rate for cases 
prosecuted.  Regardless of whether a case deliberated by judge or jury, the verdict is based on an 
evaluation of evidence presented at trial.   
 In her article, Janet Barbeau argues physical evidence rather than witness 
testimony is the key to an effective prosecution.  If collected properly and completely, 
physical evidence can form the basis for a jury’s decision.  Based on its importance, 





Barbeau notes the importance of locating and collecting evidence for a case.  Barbeau 
alleges enforcement agencies must be familiar with entities and available resources 
within their domain.  In addition, enforcement agencies must employee individuals 
capable of utilizing the most advanced and certified collection techniques that ultimately 
will present the most compelling evidence.
116
  Recognizing the importance of physical 
evidence collection and presentation in effective prosecutions, Alabama Governor Bob 
Riley provided state attorneys with a $110,000 grant in 2006 to provide training 
involving the “effective questioning of experts, proper search and seizure, legal updates 
and methods in jury selection.”
117
 
 Although prosecutions can fall apart for any number of reasons prior to trial, 
Barbeau rightfully alleges the most important element in an effective prosecution is 
evidence.  Barbeau presents logical means by which enforcement agencies can identify, 
collect and present evidence prior to and during trial.  However, without statistics or case 
studies to back her assertions, Barbeau’s article is merely a guide to effectively 
prosecuting criminals.    
Although the FBI is authorized to investigate media leaks under Executive Order 
12333, media leak investigations are often limited by the evidence available to identify 
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  The reactive nature of media leak investigations forces investigators to 
rely heavily on electronic audit records.  Typically, the evidence of the crime can be 
found in building access records, building surveillance video, telephone records, official 
e-mail header information and content, and document access records.  In most cases 
where the FBI is able to identify a subject, the alleged suspect utilized an official 
telephone or e-mail account to contact the journalist who published the information.  
Although the FBI can seek the issuance of Grand Jury subpoena to obtain a reporter’s 
telephone or e-mail records, the use of this technique requires authorization by the 
Attorney General and is not approved in every case.
119
 
 Although suspects of criminal activity are not always affiliated with an 
organization or entity, investigative agencies often have to coordinate with multiple 
entities to collect evidence in support of criminal cases.  In the case of a homicide, the 
police department must coordinate evidence collection with the County (or other) 
Medical Examiner (ME).  In the case of a moving violation (traffic ticket), the police 
must coordinate with the court and the prosecution.  Based on the coordination amongst 
various entities that do not necessarily fall under the same chain of command or share the 
same mission, it is important to understand the conflicts of bureaucratic politics.  
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 Although countries like the United States have a common foreign policy, the 
organizations comprising the federal government have differing and often competing 
missions. In J. Garry Clifford’s aptly titled essay, Bureacratic Politics, Clifford reviews 
Graham T. Allison’s Essence of Decisions and attempts to explain the realities and 
complexities unique to the bureaucracy associated with the United States.  Rather than 
evaluating historical events as a part of a common foreign policy, both Allison and 
Clifford suggest each event be analyzed through the eyes of the entities involved in 
supporting or responsible for the actions taken by the United States.  Ultimately, “policy 
flows instead from an amalgam of large organizations and political actors who differ 
substantially on any particular issue and who compete to advance their own personal and 
organizational interests as they try to influence decisions.”
120
 
 Without getting lost in the minutiae of historical foreign policy decisions, 
Clifford’s essay eloquently identifies what some would described as a flaw in the 
bureaucracy of the United States government.  Clifford acknowledges the United States 
government consists of various entities designed to support and execute various functions 
of United States foreign policy.  Although the goal of the United States foreign policy is 
to promote its interest abroad, the various and sometimes competing missions of the 
entities of the government creates gridlock and internal conflict sometimes resulting in 
unnecessary delays in action or inaction. 
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 “On those rare occasions when there is an identifiable leaker, the government 
must still decide whether prosecuting would mean divulging too many secrets to be worth 
it — starting, usually, with having to confirm in public that a particular leak was 
accurate.”
121
  Competing interests amongst the victim agencies in leak cases is one the 
reasons leak investigations rarely move forward, and precisely the reason prosecutions 
drag on for years.  The evolution of a leak case is important to understanding how 
competing organizational interests could affect the advancement of a case. 
According to the testimony of Robert S. Mueller III, the Director of the FBI, 
before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee on September 16, 2009, Executive 
order 12333 (as amended) mandates members of the United States Intelligence 
Community (USIC) report violations of law regarding the unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information to DOJ.  The agreed mechanism for notifying DOJ of an 
unauthorized disclosure is memorandum (referred to as a crimes report) that includes the 
reporting agency’s answer to the following eleven questions focusing on facts 
surrounding the disclosure: 
1) Give the date and identity of the article disclosing the classified information? 
2) Give specific statements in the article which are considered classified and 
whether the data was properly classified? 
3) State whether the classified date is disclosed accurately? 
4) State whether the data came from a specific document and, if so, the origin of 
the document and the name of the individual responsible for the security for 
the security [sic] of the classified data? 
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5) Give the extent of official dissemination of the data? 
6) State whether the data has been subject of prior official release? 
7) State whether prior clearances for publication or release of the information 
were sought from the proper authorities? 
8) State whether the material, or portions thereof, or enough background data has 
been published officially or in the press to make an educated speculation on 
the matter possible? 
9) State whether the data can be declassified for the purpose of prosecution, and, 
if so, the names of the person competent to testify concerning the 
classification. 
10) State whether declassification has been decided upon prior to the publication 
of the release of the data? 




Although most of these questions are germane to classification of the information, 
questions regarding the declassification of the information for prosecution and the effect 
of the disclosure on national defense are central to the progress of any leak investigation 
and prosecution.  The answers to these questions are not simple and require careful 
evaluation of potential source compromise, and considerations of other potentially related 
ongoing operations, and potential damage to foreign relations, etc.  Victim agencies can 
answer the information can be declassified, the information cannot be declassified for 
prosecution, or even they will consider declassifying the information.  DOJ and FBI can 
decline referrals for any number of justified reasons, but the likely reasons cases referrals 
are declined based on issues which would make prosecution difficult.  These include the 
information disclosed was too widely disseminated, incomplete or unavailable audit 
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records for individuals accessing intelligence, and the victim agency’s unwillingness to 
declassify the intelligence for use at trial.
123
  
Depending on their evaluation of the responses to the 11 questions, DOJ may or 
may not refer the case to the FBI which possesses its own discretion to initiate an 
investigation.  The predication for the investigation is based on the legal interpretation 
that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the media (an unauthorized 
recipient) is a violation of 18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, transmitting or losing defense 
information.  Upon initiating an investigation, the FBI must collect opens an umbrella 
investigation focused on the unknown subject alleged to have leaked the relevant 
information to a journalist of some sort.  Media leak cases are similar to traditional 
espionage case in that the FBI knows certain information was compromised to someone 
not authorized to receive it.  Unlike a traditional espionage case where the USIC might 
obtain SIGINT or HUMINT identifying the responsible party from intelligence collection 
efforts targeting adversaries of the United States, current law (freedom of the press, etc.) 
prevents the USIC from proactively collecting intelligence from journalists.   
 When the FBI is able to identify the individual(s) responsible for the unauthorized 
disclosure, the decision to prosecute is made through conference between the FBI, DOJ 
and the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) assigned to the case.  Although the FBI 
can be certain the identified individual is responsible for the leak, the legal standard of 
preponderance of evidence is not always easy to attain in these types of case.  Ultimately, 
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DOJ decides whether evidence supports prosecution.  If DOJ supports the prosecution, 
the case moves forward.  If not, the FBI provides the evidence to the subject’s employer 
to support the appropriate administrative sanctions.   
 Although identifying the subject of a media leak investigation seems like the 
biggest hurdle, these efforts pale in comparison to the efforts required to prosecute the 
case. According to Wainstein, prosecuting leak cases face a myriad of obstacles including 
declassification of the compromised information or other discoverable materials and legal 
challenges filed by the defense.
124
  Probably the most contentious obstacle to overcome is 
a defendant’s right to a fair trial versus the need to protect classified information from 
disclosure during a public trial.  Historically, the government has requested the 
substitution of redacted documents for original ones, substitutions of pseudonyms on 
documents and even shielding the identity of witnesses during trial in the case of 
individuals who are undercover.   
The United States Congress enacted the Classified Information Procedures Act 
(CIPA) of 1980 to ensure the protection of classified subsequent to the publication of a 
criminal indictment.  At the outset of the CIPA process (CIPA Section 3), the government 
files a motion requesting the district court issue a protective order limiting access to the 
court’s proceedings and access to the classified information to only those with the proper 
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  As defense counsel does not typically already possess a security 
clearance, the entire defense team must begin the process of obtaining a clearance before 
receiving any classified discovery from the government.  According to the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the longest processing time for the fastest 90% of Top 
Secret security clearance cases ranged from 73 days for the Department of State to 454 
days for the Central Intelligence Agency.
126
  Although this process could be expedited if 
under court’s order to do so, the court often allows the process proceed naturally.  
Therefore, defense counsel could be precluded from receiving vital discovery for 
anywhere from 2 months to over a year. 
After the designated defense counsel obtains the necessary security clearances, 
the CIPA process progresses to CIPA Section 4.  This section revolves around the 
defendant’s discovery rights and the prosecution’s discovery obligations.
127
  Under this 
section, the prosecution may file sealed motions requesting the judge’s approval to 
withhold information collected during the course of the government’s investigation.  If 
the judge concurs with the government’s motion(s), the prosecution can withhold the 
information.  If the judge disagrees, a ruling ordering the production the material can be 
issued.  In response to defense motions during CIPA Section 4, the prosecution evaluates 
the defense’s request and then either turns over the requested items files a sealed reply 
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that includes reasons for not do so.  The judge can either issue a ruling that confirms the 
prosecution’s right to withhold that information or a ruling denying the prosecution’s 
request.  This process is ongoing and dependent on motions filed by the defense.  With 
that said, every motion requires the judge to set a date for government reply and time for 
the judge to rule.   
 During CIPA Section 5 and Section 6, defense counsel typically files notice of 
intent to use certain classified information as part of the defense, as well as motions to 
suppress evidence.  CIPA includes a series of motions and suppression hearing where the 
defense demands the government turn over certain information which CIPA created a 
process in which the prosecution and defense could present evidence to either be turned 
over in discovery or used in trial to present evidence and other discovery to review, 
evaluate which implemented closed court proceedings whereas the prosecution and 
defense teams introduce classified information each side expects to introduce at trial.  
Ultimately, the presiding judge weighs the evidence presented by both sides and rules on 
the manner in which the classified information will be introduced at trial.  If the judge 
rules the defendant right to a fair trial is denied by redacting or substituting documents 
for the original classified documents, the prosecution must evaluate the damage to 
national security posed by public disclosure of the classified information by proceeding 
as mandated against dropping the charges or working out a plea bargain.
128
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  Regardless of the strength of the government’s case and barring a plea deal with 
the subject, one can expect the prosecution of a media leak case to take years. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Scholarly literature on the topic of law enforcement deterrence indicates theories 
first proposed by Beccaria in 1768 are relevant today.  Beccaria proposed that potential 
criminals will be deterred only if punishment for commission of a crime is administered 
quickly, with certainty, proportionately and publicly.  Deterrence studies have often 
focused on the effect of one or two of these pillars rather than testing all “four pillars.”
129
  
Legal rights of the accused, legal maneuvering, and judicial scheduling would likely 
hinder any efforts to test all of the “four pillars” in a meaningful way and may indicate 
Beccaria’s idea is applicable in theory as opposed to practically.    
Applying the results of research described above to the deterrent effect of 
prosecuting media leak cases identifies a significant flaw in the research question initially 
proposed.  The prosecution of a suspect is merely the legal process used to determine an 
individual’s innocence or guilt.  Ultimately, a suspect can be found innocent or guilty, 
can accept a plea bargain and in some cases the government can drop the charges.   
Significant media attention has centered on the perception that the Obama 
administration increased prosecutions of individuals suspected of leaking classified 
information as part of a veiled some sort of government secrecy.  Although the media 
                                               
129
Rudolph Gerber and John Johnson, The Top Ten Death Penalty Myths: The Politics of Crime Control 




continues to push the message that prosecutions are politically motivated, Wainstein 
offers an alternative theory that the increased prosecutions can be attributed to better 
audit capabilities in the USIC.   
  Further, the review of literature regarding effective prosecution reveals that 
evidence collection and presentation is the key to conviction.  However, recent cases such 
as WikiLeaks, clearly illustrate shortcomings in the government’s ability to audit 
computer activity and collect evidence in support of prosecution(s) for unauthorized 
disclosures.  Moreover, the bureaucratic infighting created by competing missions can be 
expected from agencies the FBI must work with to investigate these crimes.  
The wisdom gained from review of available deterrence literature clearly 
indicates the deterrent effect associated with the perceived severity of prosecuting the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information to representatives of the media (media 
leaks) is likely negated by the lack of certainty and celerity of administering sanctions.  
More explicitly and based on the wisdom gained from the review of topical literature, the 
perceived increase in prosecuting individuals suspected of leaking classified information 
will not have any measurable deterrent effect on potential leakers.   
METHODOLOGY 
 As previously indicated, the purpose of this chapter is to determine if the 
perceived increase in prosecution of individuals accused of leaking classified information 
to the media acts as a deterrent to potential “leakers.”  To formulate the hypothesis for 
this research, scholarly literature on the deterrent effect of law enforcement, effective 
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prosecution, and “the anatomy” of a media leak investigation was reviewed and analyzed.  
With a better understanding of these cases and the issues involved, this chapter provide a 
summary review of the following media leak investigations that have been prosecuted or 
are currently being prosecuted: United States v. Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, United States 
v. Stephen J. Kim, United States v. Thomas Drake, United States v. Shemai Leibowitz, 
and United States v. John C. Kirakou.  Of note, all five defendants in the captioned cases 
waived their right to a speedy trial.   
It is worth noting that Samuel Morison was the first individual charged and 
ultimately convicted of disclosing classified information to Jane’s Defense Weekly in 
1985.  Although worth noting, this chapter will not review the United States of America 
v. Samuel Morison case based on its historical nature, United States of America v. 
Bradley Manning because he was already incarcerated by the time the case was referred 
to the FBI and he was prosecuted under, the investigations of General Petraeus or Donald 
Sachtelben because they both pled guilty prior to being indicted, or the case of Edward 
Snowden because of his unlawful flight to avoid prosecution.      
To put the perception the Obama Administration implemented a crackdown on 
media leaks in perspective, this chapter included the most recent and available media leak 
statistics (2005-2009) as reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the 
United States Congress as illustrated in Exhibit 1.  Due to the classification of media leak 
statistics annually reported to the United States Congress by DOJ, this chapter uses the 
most recent and unclassified statistics as reported by the FBI. 
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 The variables contained in the data will be the number of prosecutions and the 
number of unauthorized disclosures.  If prosecuting media leak cases has a deterrent 
effect on potential “leakers,” the data will indicate the number of leaks decreases as the 
number of prosecutions increase.  If prosecution does not have a deterrent effect, the 
opposite will occur.  The perceived increase in prosecution of media leaks occurs 
subsequent to the latest data contained in Table 1.   Therefore, the statistics illustrated in 
Table 1 can support future studies involving the measurable deterrent effect of 
prosecution in the reviewed cases.  Although studies of the deterrent effect of the 
described prosecutions are relevant and necessary, the results of any future endeavor 
should account for the prevention and deterrent effect associated with the issuance of 
Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-11-06 in 2010. 
MAIN DISCUSSION 
 As established in the deterrence literature, effective deterrence requires the 
punishment to be quick, certain, public and severe.  To determine if prosecuting leakers 
has a deterrent effect, Table 7 illustrates the statistics involving the prosecution of media 
leaks over a five-year period (2005-2009) 









2005 46 7 1 0 
2006 29 9 5 0 
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2007 55 5 5 0 
2008 23 3 1 0 
2009 30 2 2 0 
Table 7: FBI Statistical Data on Leaks of Classified Intelligence Information
130
 
Although the statistics illustrated are limited to a five-year period, they clearly 
illustrate the difficulties in investigating media leak cases.  Of the 183 referrals between 
2005 and 2009, the FBI only opened 26 cases or roughly 7 % of the time.  Of the 26 cases 
opened, the FBI identified 14 subjects or approximately 54%.   Although the FBI tends to 
do well identifying a subject if a case is initiated, the identification of only 14 subjects 
out of 183 referrals equates to identifying only 8% of the individuals responsible for 
unlawfully disclosing classified information.  More astonishing is the fact that none of the 
subjects identified were indicted or otherwise charged in connected with the unauthorized 
disclosure during the time period represented in the table.   
The table above clearly establishes the lack of certainty with regards to being 
criminally prosecuted for leaking classified to the media.  However, the eleven 
individuals criminally prosecuted for disclosing classified information to the media might 
suggest the statistics are not in favor of the leakers.   A closer look at the cases associated 
with individuals actually prosecuted for this crime is required to identify the celerity, 
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Daniel Ellsberg June 13, 1971 June 28, 1971 Case Dismissed on 
May 11, 1973 
Not Applicable 
Samuel Morison July-August 
1984 
Arrested 
October 4, 1984 
On October 17, 1985, 
Morison was 
convicted of violating 
18 USC § 793(d) and 
18 USC § 793(e). 
On December 4, 
1985, Morison 
was sentenced to 
two year’s 
incarceration.  On 




Thomas Drake  Indicted on 
April 15, 2010 
On June 10, 2011, 
Drake pled guilty to 
Exceeding 
Authorized Use of a 
Computer, in 
violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1030.  
On July 15, 
2011, Drake 
was sentenced 
to one year of 
probation and 









On December 17, 
2009, Leibowitz pled 
guilty to violating 18 
USC § 798(a). 
On May 24, 
2010, Leibowitz 
was sentenced 
to 20 months in 
prison followed 





2009-2010 Charged under 
UCMJ on May 
29, 2010 
On February 28, 
2013, Manning pled 
guilty to ten counts    





information.  On July 
30, 2013, Manning 
On August 21, 
2013, Manning 
was sentenced to 
35 years' 
imprisonment, 
reduction in pay 
grade, forfeiture 
of all pay and 








the US Army. 
Stephen Jin-Woo 
Kim 
June 11, 2009 Indicted on 
August 27, 2010 
On February 7, 2014, 
Kim pled guilty to 
violating 18 USC 
§793(d). 
On April 2, 2014, 
Kim was 
sentenced to 13 
months of 
incarceration 




Jeffrey Sterling January 2006 Indicted on 
December 22, 
2010 
On January 26, 2015, 
Sterling was 
convicted of nine 
counts of 
unauthorized 
disclosure of national 
defense information 
and other related 
charges.   
On May  , 2015, 
Sterling was 
sentenced to 42 
months of 
incarceration. 
John Kirakou 2008 to 2009 Criminal 
Information 
filed on January 
19, 2012 
On October 23, 2012, 
Kiriakou pled guilty 
to violating Title 50 
USC § 421(b) 
On January 25, 
2013, Kiriakou 
was sentenced to 




May 2012 Child 
Pornography 
complaint filed 
May 15, 2012. 
On September 23, 
2013, Sachtleben 
pled guilty to 
violating 18 USC § 
793(d) 
On November 14, 
2013, Sachtleben 
was sentenced to 




May 20, 2013 Criminal 
Complaint filed 
on June 14, 
2013 
Not Applicable Not Applicable 
David Petraeus August 2011 Not Applicable On March 3, 2015, 
Petraeus pled guilty 




to violating 18 USC § 
1924 
was sentenced to 
two years of 
probation and 
ordered to pay 
$100,000. Fine. 




 Of the eleven cases illustrated in Table 8, six resulted in guilty pleas, three 
resulted in conviction, one case was dismissed, and one alleged leaker (Snowden) has 
avoided prosecution through flight.  Four of the six guilty pleas involved admission and 
sentencing for committing felonies with an average incarceration of approximately 
twenty-six months.  The leakers pleading guilty to misdemeanors have been sentenced to 
terms of probation and thus avoided jail time.  Of the three defendants who have been 
convicted, Manning was sentenced to thirty-five years of incarceration (10 counts from 
guilty plea and 12 counts from guilty verdict), Morison was sentenced to two years of 
incarceration, and Sterling was sentenced to 42 months of incarceration.  
 These statistics clearly illustrate the likelihood of criminal sanctions is fairly high 
for individuals charged with criminal violations associated with their unauthorized 
disclosure.  In fact, nine of the eleven individuals or 81.8% were criminally sanctioned 
for their actions.  The potential resolution of the case against Snowden can only increase 
the likelihood of criminal sanctions for individuals charged. 
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The statistics from Table 7 clearly illustrate the unlikelihood of prosecution, as 
well as the potential for prolonged legal process in the cases that are prosecuted.  
However, it is important to analyze a few of those cases to identify reasons for the delays 
and potential remedies.  For this reasons, this chapter will review the following cases:  
United States of America v. Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, United States of America v. 
Stephen Kim, United States of America v. Thomas Drake, United States of America v. 
Shemai Leibowitz, and United States of America v. John Kiriakou. 
 In case United States of America v. Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, the United States 
government indicted Sterling on December 22, 2010, on ten counts associated with the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information to an identified reporter.  The 
indictment alleges Sterling provided classified information including details of a CIA-
sponsored covert program targeting the weapons capabilities of an identified country 
without authorization to an identified reporter in early 2003 and again circa 2005 or 2006.  
Careful review of the charging document reveals Sterling likely disclosed the classified 
information in retaliation for the dismissal of Sterling’s racial discrimination lawsuit 
against the CIA and due to the CIA’s refusal to allow Sterling to publish his memoirs.
132
   
The five to seven year laps between the date(s) of Sterling’s disclosures and the 
date of his indictment is of particular note.   This time lapse can likely be tied to internal 
debates within the USIC about the ramifications of prosecuting Sterling including the 
likelihood of disclosing additional classified information at trial and the issues 
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surrounding the issuance of a subpoena to the article and book’s author.  Risen was 
initially served with a grand jury subpoena in 2008; however, he fought the subpoena and 
the government was able to secure an indictment two years later without his testimony.
133
  
Issues involving Risen’s potential appearance as a trial witness delayed the case 
for over four years after Sterling’s indictment.  In January 2015, the US Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit ruled a journalist’s privilege did not trump subpoena compliance; 
thus paving the way for Risen’s use as government witness.  In a remarkable turn of 
events, the prosecution decided Risen would not be called to testify.
134
  The four-year 
trial delay involving the Risen’s potential testimony masked the effect of the CIPA 
process on the trial.  Defense motions, government filings, and Court opinions issued 
through the CIPA process span approximately two and one half years from the date of 
Sterling’s indictment.
135
   
 On August 27, 2010, the United States government charged Kim with two 
criminal counts relating to the unauthorized disclosure of national defense information to 
a media representative (United States of America v. Stephen Kim).  As a result of Kim’s 
alleged disclosure, the government alleged an identified journalist authored an article 
containing SIGINT and HUMINT circa June 2009.  Based on a review of a website 
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dedicated to promoting Kim’s legal defense, www.stephenkim.org, it becomes apparent 
Kim’s defense team intends to challenge the government’s case on the grounds of Kim’s 
first amendment rights to speak with the press and questioning whether the information 
allegedly revealed was properly classified. 
136
  As discussed above, Wainstein alleges 
both potential challenges by the defense team are two of them most commonly used in 




Although not as lengthy as the time frame between Sterling’s disclosure and 
indictment, Kim’s indictment lagged his alleged disclosure by approximately 14 months.  
The CIPA and discovery process played out for Kim from the time he was indicted until 
the time he pled guilty and later sentenced in April 2014, which was a time lapse of over 
four years from the date of his unauthorized disclosure.  Kim was sentenced to 13 months 




On April 15, 2010, a grand jury indicted former National Security Agency (NSA) 
official, Thomas Drake, on ten charges related to his alleged disclosure of classified 
information to a journalist in 2006 and 2007.  In court proceedings, Drake’s defense team 
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refuted the government’s allegations that Drake disclosed classified information.  
Although Drake’s attorneys conceded Drake corresponded with the identified reporter, 
the defense described Drake as a whistleblower whose disclosures related to fraud and 
abuse at NSA rather than the disclosure of classified information.
139
  
During the Classified Information Protection Act (CIPA) proceedings for the 
case, the presiding judge ruled the government needed to use more descriptive 
substitutions in its exhibits.  After evaluating the available options, the government 
determined the parameters set forth would result in the additional release of classified 
information.  After the government withdrew the original indictment against him, Drake 
plead guilty to one charge of intentionally exceeding the authorized access of a computer 
on June 10, 2011.  Drake was later sentenced to one year of probation and community 
service.
140
  Although Drake did not receive a jail sentence for the crime he admitted, 
Drake previously had his security clearance revoked, was terminated from his 
employment at NSA and lost his government pension as a result of the government’s 
investigation.  
 Based on the time lapse between the disclosure date and date of indictment, the 
Drake case illustrates the investigative difficulties of identifying a subject and the 
potential bureaucratic infighting as it relate to using classified information in furtherance 
of prosecution.  The 14
th
 month time lapse between Drake’s indictment and guilty plea 
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illustrates both the delays of the CIPA process and potential obstacles to prosecution.  
Although appropriate for the crime in which Drake pled guilty, the sentence which 
included no jail time fails to meet the severity pillar of deterrence. 
 Although Shemai Leibowitz was employed by the FBI as a contract linguist for 
only eight months during 2009, the FBI alleged Leibowitz provided classified 
information to a person not authorized to receive the information.  Based in part on the 
strength of the government’s case, Leibowitz pled guilty to providing classified to an 
internet blogger during April 2009.
141
  Although Leibowitz accepted responsibility for his 
actions at the time of sentencing, Leibowitz claimed he was a whistleblower and 
mitigated his actions by saying he disclosed the information based on his belief that he 
uncovered violations of law.  Ultimately, Leibowitz was sentenced to 20 months in prison 
followed by three years of supervised probation.  
On January 19, 2012, the United States government filed a criminal complaint and 
arrest warrant alleging John Kiriakou violated of Title 18, United States' Code, Sections 
793(d) and 1001(a)(1), and Title 50, United States Code, Section 421(b).  Specifically, 
the government alleged Kiriakou disclosed the identities of covert US government 
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employees involved a classified program to a news reporter without authorization 
between 2008 and 2009.
142
  
Mr. Kiriakou had vowed to fight. But his chances were weakened after Judge 
Brinkema ruled on Oct. 16 that prosecutors needed only to prove that Mr. Kiriakou had 
“reason to believe” that the information he disclosed could be used to harm the country, 
not that he had intended to damage national security. 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION  
 As illustrated by the statistics in Exhibit 1, a significant number of media leak 
investigations are referred to the FBI by DOJ every year.  Absent from these statistics due 
to the classification of the information is the number of cases that are referred to DOJ.  
As described above, cases are first referred to DOJ for evaluation by the victim agency or 
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  Based on the merits of each crime’s report, 
DOJ then forwards the referrals meeting the minimum standards for initiating an 
investigation.  Although the referred crime’s reports meet DOJ minimum standard for 
case initiation, the FBI evaluates each case prior to opening.   
 As the statistics illustrate, the FBI initiated cases on only 26 out of 183 cases 
referred.  During the reporting period, the FBI identified suspects in 14 of the 26 cases.  
However, none of the identified 14 suspects were prosecuted during the reporting period.  
Although some may question the relevance of using statistics that don’t include 
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prosecutions, the lack of statistics is relevant to the research question as it relate to 
Beccaria’s initial assertion that criminal sanction act as a deterrent only if and when the 
“four pillars” are applied.    
 Superficially, the statistics seem to support the mantra of the Obama 
administration war on journalists and free speech.  Upon careful review of the case 
studies and cases mentioned but not reviewed, the fact is that most of those cases involve 
disclosures occurring outside of the date(s) covered by the statistics or the length of 
investigation prevented indictments or other legal process from occurring during the time.  
Although the statistics provide a basis for the extrapolation indicating an increase in 
media leak prosecutions, the statistics fail to indicate the reason for the lack of 
prosecution.  Most likely, the DOJ and FBI agreed the evidence in the ongoing 
investigations was not strong enough to indict a perpetrator or the collection of evidence 
is ongoing.   
Review of recent media leak cases revealed a lengthy process complete with 
obstacles including defense challenges and classification issues.  Of the four cases 
reviewed, three cases resulted in the indictment of a suspect 14 months or longer after the 
alleged disclosure occurred.   Unlike the other 3 cases, Leibowitz was sentenced within 
13 months of his disclosure based on his acceptance of a plea bargain.  The statistics 
illustrated in Exhibit 1 and the six case studies clearly indicate a lack of certainty in 
criminal punishment.  The case studies from this chapter clearly indicate sentencing for 
individuals convicted (or pleading guilty) of crimes associated with unauthorized 
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disclosures vary from probation with community service to prison terms of 
approximately three years or less, which is far less than the allowable 10 year sentence.   
As evident above, guilty pleas and/or convictions in cases involving unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information to the media are typically a fraction of the sentences 
given to convicted spies. The prosecution of leakers under the same laws as the 
government prosecutes spies is of great debate.  On one side, free speech advocates and 
the media attempt to paint all leakers as whistleblowers on condemn their prosecution as 
draconian.  On the other, there are those like Representative Hoekstra who realize leakers 
have done more damage to the USIC than those spying for a foreign government.
143
    
Spies typically disclose their secrets to a single service, which may or may not share that 
information with other liaison services.  By releasing their information to the media, the 
classified information is released to the world’s intelligence agencies as well as the 
world’s population.  Although important to mention for this chapter, the debate about the 
appropriate censure for leakers is a topic for future research and debate. 
A review of the media coverage for each of the identified cases and leaks in 
general finds media coverage tends to criticize the government’s prosecution of those 
accused or convicted of crimes associated with leaking providing classified information 
rather than the individual who allegedly leaked the information or admonishing the action 
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of leaking information that could be detrimental to our national security.
144
  Based on the 
perceived bias of media coverage, it appears the public (including potential leakers) are 
not educated of the potential repercussions of potential disclosures.  Adequate media 
coverage would inform the public of the potential and likely sanctions imposed for the 
unauthorized disclosures, as well as educating the public as to the potential monetary and 
national security losses incurred as a result of SIGINT compromise or the loss of life 
resulting from compromise of HUMINT.  
Evaluating the data indicates the original hypothesis for this chapter was accurate.  
Based on statistics, punishment resulting from media leak investigations cannot be 
described by any of Beccaria’s “four pillars.”  In these cases, punishment is not applied 
with certainty, severity, celerity or publically.  Without possessing any of these qualities 
consistently, prosecuting media leak cases does not meet the threshold for deterring 
would-be leakers. 
Although the data presented clearly illustrates the characteristics of leak 
prosecutions do not meet the threshold for Beccaria’s deterrence theory, it is important to 
acknowledge the subjective deterrent effect of the 8% chance of being identified as a 
leaker of classified information.   Although the chances of being prosecuted for the 
unauthorized disclosure is even more remote than simply being identified as the leaker,  
would-be leakers could also be deterred by potential job loss, the loss of professional 
reputation, security clearance, and in some cases reduction in retirement benefits. 
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Regardless of the reason for the leak or the government’s response to the leak, 
this chapter illustrates the importance of preventing the unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information.  As indicated in the introduction, media leaks have historically 
caused more damage to national security than spies. While this chapter presents a 
straightforward analysis of the deterrent effect of prosecuting individuals for disclosing 
our nation’s secrets without authorization, it lays the groundwork for future scholarly 
review of Beccaria’s “four pillars” and other means to stop the leak of classified 
information.  The simple results of this analysis reveal Beccaria’s “four pillars” of law 
enforcement deterrence are only applicable in an ideal world and not in a country like the 
United States where defendants are innocent until proven guilty.   
 As there is no discernible deterrent effect of prosecuting media leaks under the 
current system, other means for stopping unauthorized disclosures must be identified.  
Without any single means for stopping leaks, a multi-faceted approach is required.  
Efforts to stop unauthorized disclosures must start with prevention.  Prevention efforts 
must start with the background investigation conducted as part of the hiring process.  
Although the USIC must embrace a diverse workforce to fulfill the established mission, 
care must be taken to ensure only the most trustworthy of those deemed the “Best and 
Brightest” should be hired.  Prevention efforts should include the education or re-
education of every individual maintaining clearance regarding the importance of source 
protection.  This education should include the administration and execution of legally 
binding documents identifying the responsibilities of maintaining a clearance and the 
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ramifications of divulging classified information without authorization.  Moreover, the 
same documents should be provided to all clearance holders regardless of employer.  
As a reaction to 9/11, the USIC increased the free flow of information between 
agencies and individuals.  The resulting openness resulted in individuals having access to 
information without the appropriate need-to-know.   The perceived increase in media 
leaks after 9/11 has caused some to re-think this information sharing.  Although 
prevention is an important part of stopping the leaks, assisting with the expeditious 
identification of a suspect assists with the celerity of punishment.  Thus, the USIC should 
implement a working group to develop and implement classification guidelines 
(including access verifications) to be used consistently by each agency.  The USIC must 
invest the necessary resources to implement accredited technology supporting reliable 
and timely audit capabilities able to detect anomalous activity.  In addition, this 
technology must have the ability to preserve any collected evidence in support of possible 
future prosecutions. 
The United States Congress and DOJ should examine current legal proceedings 
for national security investigations to identify changes that may create a fairer and 
streamlined process for both the defense and prosecution.  As illustrated by the Drake 
case, the current procedures for CIPA should be evaluated to determine if a judge’s ruling 
in the CIPA hearings should be allowed to be appealed by the prosecution rather than by 
the Attorney General.  In addition, the United States Congress and DOJ should evaluate 
whether judges presiding over national security cases should be randomly selected from a 
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pool of judges with national security experience.  Although they may seem superficial or 
slanted in favor the prosecution, experienced judges and a streamlined CIPA process 
favor an expeditious and fair outcome for national security cases. 
Although most of the recommendations involve increasing prevention or 
identification capabilities, the United States Congress must do their part to eliminate 
leaks of classified information.  As previously indicated, current espionage statutes were 
written in 1917 and 1949.  Congress and the oversight committees should consider 
debating their applicability to the prosecution of media leaks especially a high-tech world 
with a twenty-four hour news cycle whereas anyone with internet access can be 













The foundation of this portfolio lies in the democratic dilemma, which involves 
the balancing act between security and liberty in democratic nations.  The inherent 
distrust of the government by the inhabitants of democracies results in oversight of the 
government’s bureaucracies.  Although secrecy is a necessary condition of the 
intelligence services’ work, intelligence services in democracies must execute their 
authorities while operating within the rule of law and under the watchful eye of oversight 
bodies.  As we have learned, intelligence failures and violations of civil liberties are 
inevitable.  Effective oversight decreases the likelihood of these occurrences and 
mitigates the extent of violations through constant monitoring. 
This portfolio began investigating Peter Gill’s theory which tied public trust to 
levels of security and intelligence oversight.  According to Gill, the inherent distrust of 
the government in democracies resulted in increased intelligence, whereas the increased 
trust in authoritarian regimes resulted in decreased levels of intelligence oversight.  This 
portfolio tested the applicability of Gill’s theory to intelligence oversight in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia, which are considered similar western 
democratic and economically advanced nations.  The research conducted for this project 
identified strong oversight in all of the countries.  However, the applicability of Gill’s 
theory to similar countries was not able to be proven with the available public trust data.   
Although public trust polling has been conducted in the United States for decades, 
international polling has been inconsistent at best.  As discussed in the public trust 
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literature, the results are only as good as the polling pool and the data input.  Another 
potential reason for inaccurate findings could be the use of trust in Government numbers 
to determine levels of oversight.  The accuracy of future research regarding potential 
linkages could be increased with consistent international public opinion polling.  In 
addition, polling that specifically addresses public’s trust in the effectiveness of the 
intelligence community, as well as the public’s trust in the intelligence community’s 
respect for civil liberties and the nation’s laws.  Future scholarship aimed correlating 
public trust and intelligence oversight should also consider if the metrics used for 
measuring strength of intelligence oversight for this chapter was effective or could be 
improved in some manner.    
As the country with the highest level of intelligence oversight, the second chapter 
evaluated the effectiveness of intelligence oversight in the United States.  Assumedly, 
little had changed in the five years since Zegart characterized congressional oversight as 
ineffective and sporadic.  However, the recent interest in the topic provided more than 
enough justification for the updated and expansive review.  Zegart’s innovative approach 
to evaluating intelligence oversight using legislative activity metrics formed the 
foundation for the research in this portfolio.  As with Zegart’s research, my work found 
intelligence oversight in the United States to be ineffective in comparison to other 
oversight committees and linked this to a lack of constituent interest. 
Critics of this methodology used for this portfolio argue that the oversight 





  Additionally, publication of documentation of regarding legislative activity 
and other oversight activities (briefings, interviews, etc.) for HPSCI and SSCI are 
inconsistent and at times non-existent.  More important than the number of hearings or 
reports, is what transpires in the hearings or meetings or the content of the reports.  In 
addition to the hearings themselves, it is important to consider the congressional response 
to hearings.  I acknowledge the limitations of this type of metric-based analysis of 
intelligence oversight; however, these metrics provide a baseline for comparison between 
oversight committees and a general characterization of intelligence oversight. 
 As we have seen, the ineffectiveness of intelligence oversight can be tied to a lack 
of public interest.  It is unclear if this lack of interest can be tied to being uninformed 
about intelligence, or simply feeling as if they are unaffected by intelligence.   As the 
research has shown, it is impossible to know or even estimate the number of every ad hoc 
meetings or briefings, or communications amongst the oversight apparatus that occurs 
outside the normal course of business
146
 and thus, evaluating congressional oversight is 
limited to the publically available and documented information.  Thus, HPSCI and SSCI 
must improve their focus on transparency to include increased public hearings, as well as 
increase the tracking and publication of committee activities associated with their 
oversight duties.  Beyond holding the USIC accountable, transparency in oversight 
activities can help educate the public and spur public debate on intelligence which had 
been lacking before the Snowden disclosures.   
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Linkages between the ineffectiveness of congressional oversight have been tied to 
a lack of public interest.  Zegart relied on a lack of intelligence related lobbying and 
public affairs groups, while I relied on national election exit polling.  All signs points to a 
lack of public interest, which correlates to a lack of congressional attention to oversight.  
Recent national election exit polls appear to illustrate the relative unimportance of 
intelligence or civil liberties to voters.  However, it is important to note that neither was 
available to respondents as potential choices.   Polling organizations should consider 
either expanding the potential voter issue pool, or allowing voters to reply to polling 
questions with their own answers.   
The chapter on intelligence oversight was founded on the understanding that 
structural reform of congressional oversight was highly unlikely.  The chances of either 
consolidating appropriations authority within HPSCI and SSCI were unlikely, as were 
considerations for the formation of a joint standing committee. Thus, the chapter focused 
on identifying real changes aimed at increasing the effectiveness of intelligence oversight 
that could occur in short order.  Overwhelmingly, this chapter identified staffing levels, 
competency, and turnover of committee staff was as an area to be improved upon 
immediately.  Congress should focus on increasing committee staff levels and 
capabilities, as well as increasing staff retention rates for HPSCI and SSCI.  As the 
Sunlight Foundation suggests, higher salaries or other monetary compensation provides 
the easiest means to increase and retain committee staff.  Therefore, future research of 
intelligence oversight should focus on USIC committee staffing issues.  
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In addition to Zegart’s metric-based analysis, intelligence oversight literature 
cited the inability to pass Intelligence Authorization legislation between FY 2006-2009, 
the DOJ’s use of the Espionage Act of 1917 to investigate and prosecute leakers, and 
their inability to pass vital intelligence reforms as evidence of ineptitude.
147
  Of these, the 
prosecution of media leaks provided the most testable option based on critics claims that 
the draconian use of outdated laws deter potential whistleblowers and stifle free speech.  
The purpose of criminal prosecution is two-fold: punish the offender and deter would-be 
criminals.  Since both sides appeared to agree on the perception of deterrence, this 
portfolio reviewed the case particulars for historical prosecutions of media leaks to 
determine if they serve as a deterrent.   
The results overwhelmingly suggest that prosecuting media leaks do not serve as 
a deterrent to would be criminals.  Critics of media leak prosecutions have claimed 
potential leakers would be deterred long before the disclosures of Bradley Manning and 
Snowden.  Their disclosures, which are considered the most massive in history, along 
with the data presented in this chapter confirm the lack of deterrent effect.  The lack of a 
deterrent effect combined with the negative perception of using 18 U.S. Code § 793 to 
prosecute media leaks should serve as an impetus for congressional consideration and 
potential introduction of legislation.  The findings of this chapter are relevant to the topic 
of oversight based on the common misperception that its sole purpose is the prevention of 
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intelligence failures and government abuses.  However, oversight includes the drafting 
and consideration of laws under which the USIC operates. 
As the evidence has shown, DOJ will continue to prosecute individuals accused of 
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the media will continue as long as 
a subject can be identified, the victim agency is willing to consider releasing additional 
classified information during trial, and sufficient evidence is identified.  Based on the 
ineffectiveness of intelligence oversight confirmed through this portfolio, passage of 
newer laws or sanctions which separate media leaks from spy cases is unlikely.  Opinions 
of potential appropriate sanctions for media disclosures are split between criminal and 
administrative sanctions and fines.  Future scholarship and discussion about media 
disclosures should include focus on identifying sanctions that punish and deter.   
As there is no discernible deterrent effect of prosecuting media leaks under the 
current system, other means for stopping unauthorized disclosures must be identified.  
Without any single means for stopping leaks, a multi-faceted approach is required.  
Efforts to stop unauthorized disclosures must start with prevention.  Prevention efforts 
must start with the background investigation conducted as part of the hiring process, as 
well as include the re-education of every individual maintaining clearance. This 
education should include the administration and execution of legally binding documents 
identifying the responsibilities of maintaining a clearance and the ramifications of 
divulging classified information without authorization.  Moreover, the same documents 
should be provided to all clearance holders regardless of employer.  
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As a reaction to 9/11, the USIC increased the free flow of information between 
agencies and individuals.  The resulting openness resulted in individuals having access to 
information without the appropriate need-to-know.   The perceived increase in media 
leaks after 9/11 has caused some to re-think this information sharing.  Although 
prevention is an important part of stopping the leaks, assisting with the expeditious 
identification of a suspect assists with the celerity of punishment.  Thus, the USIC should 
implement a working group to develop and implement classification guidelines 
(including access verifications) to be used consistently by each agency.  The USIC must 
invest the necessary resources to implement accredited technology supporting reliable 
and timely audit capabilities able to detect anomalous activity.  In addition, this 
technology must have the ability to preserve any collected evidence in support of possible 
future prosecutions. 
  Although considered ineffective, intelligence oversight in the United States is the 
strongest of those reviewed.  This strength combined with the plethora of scholarly work 
on the topic clearly illustrates the importance of intelligence oversight in our democracy.  
As long as we continue the debate about intelligence and civil liberties, the attention will 
the oversight committees to implement the changes necessary to increase their 
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